


the **ALTERNATIVE**



**Mark Twain:
The Scrooge Phase**

see page 17

Hook on The Disorder of Our Times
Gershman on Israel

reviews:

Cooper on Herrnstein
Hyneman on Shils
Rosen on Fellow Travellers

the *ALTERNATIVE* *to bare the witness and the truth*

DEPARTMENTS

The Continuing Crisis	2
Editorial: R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.	3
The Business of America: Lindley H. Clark Jr.	4
Contributors	8
Letter from a Whig: C. Bascom Slemp	15
The Public Policy: Peter Rusthoven	20
Talkies: Benjamin Stein	23
Brudnoy's Film Index	26
Correspondence	28
The Bootblack Stand	29
Current Wisdom: by Assorted Jackasses	30

ARTICLES

Sidney Hook: Reflections on the Disorder of Our Times	5
James Grant: Multinationals and the Limits of Power	7
Carl Gershman: Israel's Fate	9
J. Tim Fennell: Soviet Ambitions in the Mideast	10
George Will: Prophets and Profits	11
Benjamin Stein: Nixon: His Friends and His Enemies	13
Harold Mott: The Case for Negative Votes	16

REVIEWS

Judy Tyrrell on <i>Mark Twain: God's Fool</i>	17
Charles S. Hyneman on <i>The Intellectuals and the Powers</i>	18
D.W. Cooper on <i>I.Q. in the Meritocracy</i>	21
Stephen Rosen on <i>The Fellow Travellers</i>	22
Allen Crawford: "A Last-Ditch Stand"	24

Published remarkably without regard to race, color, creed or (most redundantly of all) national origin—and yes, sex, even sex.

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☆ The Continuing Crisis ☆

● November, in this year of Grace! The Nixon Administration, ably supported by the Congress, the media, and enlightened opinion, continues its dazzling performance. Before the month began President Nixon and the incomparable Washington press corps held a spitting contest in the conference room of the White House, and on November 3 rumor spread that Mr. Nixon was actually preparing to resign. To reassure a fevered nation the Chief Executive went boating with Mr. Bebe Rebozo and divulged plans for a counteroffensive against those scoundrels who suspect him of various low deeds. As the month wore on, and with his enemies crying for everything from impeachment to defenestration, it became clear that the President had decided to step out into the public arena, allowing the famed Nixon charm to speak for itself. Top aides suggested that he accent the positive, stressing, for instance, that despite the enormous size of the White House, only two tapes and a few memos had been lost. Further, in the Watergate Capers, at least, no one drowned.

● As the year drew to a close government economists began summing up the achievements of wage and price controls. Though inflation remained well above the desired rate of four percent, officials emphasized that it was still much lower than in foreign countries like Chile, and besides,

there were only shortages in paper, beef, canned foods, fish, aluminum, tennis balls, zinc, and fuel.

● "Who in the World Is My Neighbor?" was the clever theme for World Community Day, celebrated all around the world on November 6. Congress overrode the President's veto of the War Powers Bill, and a rare albino sea turtle was born at the Florida Department of Natural Resources—just two days after the FDA recalled thousands of defective Chef Crissie's Pizza Pies. Meanwhile in Chicago, Mrs. Wendy Berlowitz's courageous campaign to effect the "downfall of Western Civilization and the Judeo-Christian ethic" ended in a Chicago hoosegow when the "full-time revolutionary and part-time folk singer" was apprehended for exposing her mammary glands before 2,500 politically aroused males in the Civic Center Plaza, scene of so many of Chicago's new politics rallies. The strikingly eloquent orator was bounced from the premises by Mayor Daley's ruffians in blue and booked for disorderly conduct, public indecency, and performing without a permit—precisely what we have come to expect from Western Civilization.

● Yet the struggle for a more dwellable world was not confined to downtown Chicago. In a bold step against institutional sexism, Ohio State University's Sigma Phi

Epsilon employed a five-foot two-inch, one hundred and seventy-five pound house-mother, Mr. Jim Sword. Decades of repression fell away in Montgomery County, Virginia, when women fire fighters finally won the right to ride hook and ladder trucks and to enter flaming buildings with axes, hoses, and other accoutrements of their trade. Henceforth only neuter terms will be used to designate jobs by the Census thanks to the prodigious pressures placed on the Census Bureau by freedom fighters in the government's Manpower Administration and Women's Bureau. Even more heart-warming news came from Laurel, Maryland, where women's liberationists are still crowing over the victory of that three-year-old thoroughbred, Dahlia, who won the Washington, D.C. International from a field of male competitors. She is the first female ever to win that famed horse race, though in recent years there has been talk of entering Germaine Greer. And if sisterhood is powerful in the stables, imagine what it must be like in Weehawken, New Jersey, where the public works commission has bowed to demands that it hire a lady street cleaner!

● Common Cause, the Washington virtue lobby, has become suspicious about Judge Sirica's mysterious commutation of the

(continued on page 31)

Of Moose and the Movement

During this century one American weakness which has inspired in the civilized minority many ribald hoots and much roistering derision has been the American weakness for inane ceremony, fatuous commemoration, and nincompoop pageantry. These trashy get-togethers are renowned for having nothing to do with their brassy ideals and everything to do with self-promotion and adolescent merriment. Since the time of Twain genial skeptics have heehawed at their asinine pretensions. Rotary shindigs and other such hollow shows of yahoo sentiment are plainly ludicrous, and the skeptics have long delighted in snatching by the scruff of the neck the impresarios of these oaf gatherings, raising them above the wallow of their disciples, and exposing them hissing and shrieking for all the world to see.

Sinclair Lewis called these patheticoes Babbitts, and H.L. Mencken called them and their gullible epigones boobos. But whatever one calls them and in whatever tent they assemble, they are always dull, mindless donkeys who ingest the received truths of their time only to burp up bubbles of flatulent sentiment in place of solid ideas or individual perspectives.

What has always intrigued me about this impulse to band together in high-minded organizations and juvenescence is that it inheres throughout much of American society. Whether Americans join together to further the highest standards of their trade or the highest ideals of the human spirit, the organization they leave behind eventually degenerates into a pretext for singing songs and flying paper airplanes. No matter if Americans band together to usher in world peace or to bring succor to crippled children, they usually end by playing golf. Despite class, vocation, or political mythology, the clods who join these bogus organizations generally act according to instinct rather than intellect—their spasming hearts instinctively pump vast gushes of blood into their cheeks whenever the time is at hand for some exaggerated ceremony or convention.

These poor souls have very little regard for the highfalutin sentiments that ostensibly summon them to assemble. Every intelligent observer of the American scene knows that Rotarians are not diligent samaritans but goof-offs and glad hands. Moose, Elks, Pythians, and their cohorts soak themselves in beer and tommyrot. And, as the years roll under the old bridge, it is becoming inescapably obvious that even the august organizations of the American Enlightenment are not exempt from this characteristically American hollowness.

Consider the American Civil Liberties Union. Not only is the average member of this service organization a prodigious ass, but he is a perpetual sophomore when it comes to thinking seriously about primordial questions of liberty. The ACLU's patrimony to the civil liberties of the average gringo is about as useful as a secondhand toothbrush. Its response to the infamy of

airport frisks is illustrative. Rather than defend the rights of the millions of Americans whose privacy was invaded by this totalitarian hors d'oeuvre, the ACLU instead set off on a bizarre crusade to defend those hapless traffickers in illicit drugs who had been perchance nabbed during an airport frisk. So it was that as the ACLU prated on about the tender rights of arrant criminals, a precedent was set that will authorize government agents to run their fingers over the bodies of ordinary citizens for years to come. And so it goes. This very day there bubbles in every state capital coercive legislation that will empower state police to stop and search any civilian automobile whose passengers are suspected of the high crime of riding *sine* seatbelt—not a peep has issued from the ACLU nor is one expected. Coercion that throttles the great mass of the citizenry simply does not trouble the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. To attract the defense of the ACLU's pettifoggers the average driver will have to be arrested while fleeing a bank robbery or a multiple kidnapping. Only then will the curtailment of civil rights prove interesting to the ACLU. Think of it! Millions of American drivers, choosing of their own free will to wink at the Reaper by ignoring their seatbelts, will suffer harassment, though they endanger not one other soul on this globe. Meanwhile the ACLU will lie in wait for that one moment of libertarian melodrama when some cop, investigating for seatbelt evaders, apprehends a rapist in the act. Then these doughty defenders of civil liberties will pounce, the Bill of Rights will be rescued, and freedom preserved . . . but only for the seatbeltless rapist, kidnapper, or bank robber. That is the ACLU's service to liberty. And it is about all one can expect from a mob of joiners and doers.

The Americans for Democratic Action is the same kind of floorshow. Does anyone actually believe that the average ADAers assemble in a national convention to elucidate matters of democratic process like so many latter-day Madisons and Masons? Bosh! The ADAers assemble for the same reason any other conventioners take leave of their wives' cuisine. They congregate to pickle their tonsils in booze, swap lies, and hopefully fall transiently in love with some \$25-an-hour lady of delights. When in concert, the ADA is not much different than the Shrine except for the fact that, whereas the Shrine's interest in little children is contained to little children, the ADA's solicitude for little children is directed at all mankind.

And so it goes. Americans gather for some grand purpose, hoist exalted banners around the convention hall, and shoot spitballs. Thinking Americans have almost become inured to such atrocities, but occasionally the dissimulations are riveting, especially when American pecksniffs choose to hold a peace and freedom spectacular at the very time when in another country brave men are sweating it out beneath the totalitarian's boot. I speak of the

sad condition of the Russian Jews and intelligentsia and of the obvious hypocrisy of that crowd of American martyrs who seem to hold combined memberships in the peace movement, the youth culture, the counter-culture, and numberless other trendy enthusiasms as yet unborn.

Are these children of "the movement" as they call it actually serious about peace, freedom, vitamin E, or any of the other august sonorities their leaders roar about? Only the most gullible sap would think so. Most of them simply gather to parade their superior virtue before television cameras, while kicking up their heels, teasing the constabulary, and collecting anecdotes with which to bore their fated descendants. These windy frauds spent the last years of the Vietnam war signing anguished proclamations in local newspapers, molesting their neighbors, and conventioning, with an avidity that stunned even seasoned troopers of the Shrine and the American Legion. And though they have marched for some of the most dubious causes ever concocted, though the times are no longer auspicious for their spoonery, they nevertheless show no sign of making any reassessment, not even after dissidents of the genuine variety like Alexander Solzhenitsyn warn them that their tomfoolery is threatening the flickering light of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. When Mr. Solzhenitsyn recently spoke out against the rising generation of Chamberlains in the West, the movement pretended he was on their side (pretending being one of their most popular intellectual exercises). When he dismissed the Hon. Ramsey Clark as a "fluttering butterfly" for his collaboration with the North Vietnamese, the movement merely put him down as a CIA plot, and its members washed their paws of him. For the movement is like so many other American organizations composed of congenital joiners and doers. It is a facade, behind which thousands of unserious clods escape the gray realization of their own uselessness. Engauded with the most sublime principles, it allows middle-class gringos to pretend they are freedom fighters without ever having to confront Solzhenitsyn.

Even now the eminentoes of the movement are jetting around the Republic planning and organizing extravaganzas for peace and justice as though the 1960s had never ended. So ardent is their Babbitt zeal that I would not be surprised to hear that Jane Fonda and the Berrigan Boys were planning a peace float for the Rose Bowl Parade, or perhaps the entry of a movement candidate in the Miss America Contest. Perhaps they will initiate their own contest, say, a Miss Anti-American Contest. It would come as no surprise for they are 100 percent American boosters. They have done no more for the cause of peace or freedom in the world than the WCTU did for the cause of soft drinks.

No action could have more eloquently bespoken their disregard for their reputed

(continued on page 26)



Lessons in Free Enterprise (III)

What follows is the third of four columns by the economic news editor of the Wall Street Journal on the practice of business in America.

For more years than anyone cares to remember, labor unions have been telling the public that fat corporate profits are a major, if not the major, cause of inflation. The argument makes sense only if you assume that businessmen can and do collusively raise their prices to whatever level they choose—and then go on selling as much as they want to sell at the new, highly profitable price levels.

Competition is indeed far from perfect, and the government ought to stiffen it with intelligent antitrust enforcement, removal of import barriers, and other steps. But even in the imperfect market businessmen in recent years have found that there is a limit to how far they can raise their prices. Unless the government finances an inflation by printing up fresh supplies of money, businessmen are likely to find that prices can go down as well as up.

The idea that business hunger for profits causes inflation, however, helps to explain the government control approach this time around. Price increases have been permitted only when the government, in its wisdom, decided that the boosts would not unduly fatten profits. Some of the results have been ridiculous: often, the legal list prices stood at levels much higher than those at which businessmen were really selling goods; until this year, the steel industry has provided a prime example.

The total lack of correlation between profits and inflation shows up in the historical record. Despite the horrendous inflation of this year, corporate profits still are a much smaller slice of the gross national product than they were in the early 1960s, when inflation—by recent standards—was little more than negligible.

Though profits don't cause inflation, they do perform an economic role. They are in effect the engine that keeps the economy moving in one direction or another, or up or down. If an entrepreneur provides a new service or product that the public wants, the public rewards him with profits—assuming, of course, that he manages his business reasonably efficiently.

Profits encourage the entrepreneur to expand his business, hoping that the public will buy more and more of what he has to sell. Resources are drawn into his business and used productively, since they are filling a public want or need. Profits can't be kept secret, either. Other entrepreneurs see

them and are encouraged to provide competition. The competition, as it grows, keeps the level of prices and profits down.

If this process continued indefinitely, profits would be eliminated. But it can't continue indefinitely. Under the pressure of competition the businessmen try to improve their product or service or develop new ones. If they can't, a generally declining level of profits leads some firms to abandon the field, shifting resources to areas that look more promising.

If a firm is to remain in a given industry, it must earn profits sufficient to provide what its owners consider to be an adequate rate of return on their capital. If they don't earn what they feel they are entitled to, they take their money elsewhere. What they feel they are entitled to is a decent reward for accepting the risks of the business they own.

And there are risks. Labor unions are willing to go along with controls on wages only as long as the government also enforces controls on profits. But the difference, which the unions prefer to ignore, is that profit rates, unlike wage rates, often go down as well as up.

Corporate profits, after taxes, came to \$53 billion last year, a 15.5 percent increase from 1971 and well above the previous record of \$50 billion in 1966. Last year's earnings, however, amounted to less than 5 percent of the gross national product; the 1966 profits were close to 7 percent of the GNP.

This year, of course, has been even better. After-tax profits in the first quarter were 28 percent above what they were a year earlier, and in the second quarter the year-to-year gain was 34 percent. The increases will be smaller in the last half of this year, and for the year as a whole the profits still will be only around 5 percent of the GNP. Next year, under the impact of a business slowdown, corporate profits will be no better than this year and quite possibly will decline. Such are the risks that business owners must take.

At the moment many industries are planning major spending programs to enlarge their production capacity. The shortages and the upward price pressures of recent weeks have helped to show the need for greater output.

The need stems partly from the impact of two dollar devaluations. Many foreign producers have been priced out of U.S. markets that they have cultivated during the past decade. U.S. producers have a chance to enlarge their market shares but many don't have the capacity to do it.

Under the pressures of foreign competition in the 1960s, these producers were unable to raise their prices much. The controls program that began in August 1971 and the regulations that followed it have limited the producers' ability to raise prices now. So their rates of return are so lousy that few of those people possessed of capital are willing to invest it in such companies.

Unless supply can be brought into better balance with demand, the inflationary pressures will persist. So the Cost of Living Council is going to have to let prices rise in some industries if it wants to have any hope of holding prices down in the long run. A controls program always makes economics sound a little silly.

Some economists think that the controls program will be eased enough and in time, and government officials have in fact been stressing their desire to facilitate increased production. But public opinion polls now say that inflation is far and away the public's biggest worry, and 1974 is an election year. Unless consumers become entirely disenchanted with the whole program, the chances are that some form of controls will remain. Most economists now think that inflation will persist at a rate of 4.5 percent to 5 percent or so at least for the next five years.

A few economists, clutching at straws, think that businessmen may be ingenious enough to thwart the controls with some under-the-table evasion. But very much of that sort of approach probably would only lead to an enlargement of the enforcement apparatus, which already seems to be growing fairly rapidly.

Another straw is that the people running the controls program really don't believe in it. John Kenneth Galbraith, the articulate Harvard economist, claims that it has been a lot like putting the Pope in charge of a birth control program. But in Washington politics appears to be much more potent than personal feelings.

This year's profits levels are not only low as a portion of the gross national product; they are inflated by some factors that offer businessmen little long-range comfort. For one thing, profits have been heavily influenced by the surge of inflation; businessmen have found that their inventories suddenly were worth more. Also boosting profits were the February dollar devaluation and the subsequent market decline of the dollar. Earnings returned to U.S. parent companies by foreign subsidiaries suddenly have been worth more.

Such profits, of course, are transitory—unless you want to assume that inflation and the decline of the dollar will continue to accelerate. And if you assume that, you assume the not-very-slow collapse of the economy, something that isn't too good for profits either.

So the controls stay on and continue to squeeze profits. Congress early next year will consider whether to renew the authority for the program, and it's sure that labor will insist that profits and wages be linked together—if any controls continue. But no one will win any friends in the labor movement by suggesting that wage increases next year be no larger than profits gains. □

the *ALTERNATIVE*



Sidney Hook

Reflections on the Disorder of Our Times

The following essay is adapted from a speech given by Dr. Sidney Hook at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Open Court Editorial Advisory Board.

The times, as I have known them, have always been in a state of disorder. Disorder and disorganization are perennially popular themes. A few years ago, the basic course in "Social Organization" at a prestigious university drew a mere handful of students. But just as soon as the title of the course was changed to "Social Disorganization," without any change in content, students flocked to it in such numbers that it had to be given in several sections. In part, the attractiveness of the theme flows from the same reasons that explain why we never gossip about our neighbor's virtues, but only about their vices.

The very meaning of *disorder* presupposes a value or set of values from whose standpoint we assess the state of affairs we regard as disorderly. Without reference to values, every state of the world is in a state of order. And unless there were some preliminary agreement on values and ideals, one man's order would be another's disorder, and vice versa.

Until recently, there seemed to be a rough consensus on these values and ideals in American life even when we differed on the program, parties, and means of achieving them. That consensus was expressed as a commitment to the democratic process, and to the mechanisms of registering freely-given consent, a consent freely given because it included the right to dissent. It was a commitment to the rights of individuals, and where rights conflict, as they always do in moral situations, to their resolution in the light of the common good. It was a commitment to the pursuit of desirable freedoms by the arts of intelligence. These values and ideals, eloquently expressed by the founding philosopher-statesmen of the American Republic, made it possible for us to be vigorous opponents without becoming embittered enemies, to contend with each other within the democratic system without destroying it, and encouraged the submission of all con-

flicting claims to the arbitrament of reason through civilized discourse.

The disorder that we should all deplore in our time is largely the consequence of the erosion of these values and ideals, and the resulting abandonment of rational processes of debate, the resort to means that subvert the moral and legal ends of a free society, and the emergence not only of cults of violence but of attitudes that encourage resort to violence and to threats of violence. I find this erosion not only in the market places and public squares of the nation, but even in our institutions of higher education.

The Watergate scandal is the most recent and flagrant betrayal of the implicit political consensus of American democracy. All Americans who accept the democratic commitment—Republicans, Democrats, Socialists—are unanimous in their condemnation of the action and their desire to bring the conspirators to justice. These betrayers differ only in degree from those Americans who, not satisfied to exercise their perfectly legitimate right to dissent against American involvement in Vietnam, traveled to Hanoi and became not only the apologists of one of the most terroristic regimes in the Communist world, but willing agents in the propaganda pressures to brainwash American prisoners—their fellow citizens—into denouncing their own government, some of whom were tortured for their stubborn refusal to accede. There is something rather odd in the fact that many who cry up the first kind of betrayal play down (when they do not ignore) the second.

But it is not so much public events that concern me here, as certain trends in the cultural and educational atmosphere that seem to contribute to the intellectual, social, and ultimately moral disorder of our times. These trends are more dangerous because of their seeming respectability and legitimacy. I cannot make a complete inventory of them, but some are so pervasive as to be easily recognizable on many campuses in the country.

I mention first the growth of anti-intellectualism and irrationalism, which takes many bizarre forms and centers around cults, doctrines, and charismatic figures

from the intellectual underworld. Throughout, one of its most ominous themes is the denigration of science and of scientific knowledge on the simplistic ground that science is responsible for its technological uses and abuses, for environmental pollutions and military applications. How often have we heard not only from the pundits of the press, television, radio, and other pulpits, but in universities, that science and scientists were responsible for the use of the atomic bomb? A whole library of literature has developed around this simple and central confusion. The truth is that the discovery and liberation of atomic energy and nuclear energy did not dictate its uses any more than the invention of the knife or any other of man's tools determined whether they were to be used to preserve or destroy life. As well say that the invention of writing, which makes it possible to write either a love letter or a poison pen letter, determines what we write.

The decision to use the atomic bomb to shorten the war with Japan, and thus save lives—whether one considers it right or wrong, and I consider it right or the lesser evil in the historical situation—was a *political* decision, not one made by scientists. All decisions to use or refrain from using scientific discoveries are social and moral. Indeed our only hope of counteracting the consequences of past social misuses of science and technology, as our concern with ecology shows, is through more intelligent applications of science, not by a moratorium on scientific discovery. For example, our best prospect of coping with the worst threat to the ultimate survival of mankind in a free and decent society—the threat of overpopulation—depends upon the further advances of science.

Anti-intellectualism is also expressed in a growing tendency to declare certain areas of scientific research as taboo. A few months ago, sixty leading biologists and psychologists issued a manifesto protesting "the suppression, censure, punishment, and defamation that are being applied against scientists who emphasize the role of heredity in human behavior"—both individual and group behavior. There is a strong ten-

dency today to make one's biology fit one's politics, and from Harvard to Berkeley outstanding scientists exploring the role of heredity in learning are being harassed and threatened. This is a consequence of a failure to distinguish purely scientific questions from moral ones. The statement in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal is not a proposition in biology, but in ethics. It is a postulate concerning the moral equality of men and women, *regardless* of their physical and intellectual differences. Just as in a family, the variation in the natural capacities or the IQs of children—which may range from 80 to 140—has no bearing on the right of each child to be treated as a person, with all the rights and privileges of a person, so in the democratic community. Whatever genetic differences exist among individuals or groups, whether racial, religious, sexual, or ethnic, have no bearing on their political rights as citizens who are equally entitled to the protection of the laws, and to an equality of concern on the part of the community to provide the appropriate social and educational opportunities for each person to develop himself or herself to the fullest growth. If democracy is regarded as a way of life, the conclusions of any research into hereditary factors in group or individual learning behavior can be used to help persons realize their educational potential just as the study of hereditary factors in group or individual medicine can be used to help persons to achieve or preserve good health.

Anti-intellectualism and irrationalism are not restricted to popular thinking about scientific and natural affairs. They are even more in evidence in popular thought about the world of human affairs. Here they express themselves in the forms of absolutism and fanaticism which are almost invariably the consequence of an absence of *historical* perspective. George Santayana once defined a fanatic as a person who having forgotten his goal redoubles his efforts. It seems to me however that the fanatic is better defined as a person who pursues his goal at all costs, who is willing to pay any price, employ any means to achieve it, even if in the process he destroys equally legitimate goals. At any given time, there is always a disparity between worthy moral and social ideals and the status quo, between our goals and our achievements—particularly if we have raised our sights in the course of our struggle towards them. If we take an *unhistorical* approach to the present, and focus only on the ideal, we become fixated on how far we have fallen short, and disregard the progress made and the distance we have come. Those who were born yesterday, so to speak, charge the preceding generations with betrayal of the ideal or with hypocrisy in their profession of allegiance to it, as if it makes no difference, because of the perceptible gap between ideal and reality, how wide the gap is, whether the generations that have tried to bridge it have fallen 90, 50, or 10 percent short. Those without historical perspective think in terms of either-or rather than in terms of more-or-less. The all-important direction of the process of change is ignored. Impatience with the gap between ideal and reality leads to an abandonment of the process that has hitherto narrowed

it, to a tendency to resort to shortcuts and sometimes to violence that far from diminishing the distance between fact and ideal, provokes the backlash and reaction that increase it.

With respect to every major area and institution in American life—be it civil rights, standards of living and welfare, race relations, access to education—an historical approach will show that incremental reforms have carried us closer to the ideals to which this nation was originally dedicated than has been the case in the vaunted revolutionary Communist regimes anywhere in the world, whose fanatical partisans have held them up to us as models. We have no justification, of course, for complacency. Grave problems and difficulties still abound. But it is this failure to take an intelligent historical approach that seduces persons of good will from being critics *within* a democratic culture into adversaries dedicated to its overthrow, and converts them, by virtue of the means they use, into hardened immoralists without compassion. The purity of spirit of the unhistorical Utopian absolutist, frustrated by a reality it does not comprehend, be-



comes transmuted into nihilistic rage. The best results are corrupted into the worst.

This unhistorical perspective and its absolutist pronouncements on the shortcomings of American culture are accentuated by a double standard of morality in the making of comparative political judgments. The achievements of Communist dictatorships in Russia and China are lauded in the light of their past—history is relevant here!—but the far more impressive achievements of the democratic regimes in Europe and Asia, like West Germany and Japan, in which dissent has not been crushed, are ignored. There is something disheartening about the recent reports of travellers to mainland China who broadcast glowing reports of alleged material gains without any reference to the total suppression of freedom within its borders. It is reminiscent of those who brought back glowing reports of material gains made by Italians under Mussolini and by German workers under Hitler as if the costs in human freedom and degradation counted for nothing.

Not all who invoke the historical approach in politics do so in a rational or scientific spirit. Only too often history is

rewritten for purposes of special pleading or to further a partisan cause or interest. Today in some academic quarters, and in all of the writings of the so-called counter-culture, there is an impassioned attack on the whole concept of objectivity and objective truth—especially in history—as if in the last analysis there is no difference between historical fiction and fact. Logically the position is self-defeating and incoherent, but that hasn't prevented the uncritical-minded from being infected, first with a wholesale skepticism about the possibility of historical truth, and finally with an irresponsible and inconsistent dogmatism.

The attack on objectivity proceeds from the truism that no one can legitimately claim to possess the *whole* truth or the *absolute* truth about anything, to the absurdity that there are no degrees of truth or that all views about history are equally probable. The incoherence of the position should be apparent. These historians not only impugn the concept of objectivity and historical truth, they accuse other historians of errors, distortions, and sometimes outright lies. But if there was no such thing as truth or objectivity, the very words "error," "distortion," "lie" would be meaningless, for their meaning or use depends upon the implicit claim of the person who utters them that he knows the truth. Furthermore, if there were no concept of objectivity, we could not distinguish between "guilt" or "innocence" upon which so much of civilized society depends.

Sometimes the disregard for objectivity is explained in terms of a definition of the intellectual as one who seeks power by means of the dissemination of his views. According to this approach, ideas function as weapons in the clash of opinions that grow out of conflicting interests of nations, parties, and personalities. The difficulties of this explanation are many. First of all, the term power is being used in such a broad sense that it has no intelligible opposite. Everyone would be seeking "power" in some way or other. But in ordinary discourse we make a sharp distinction between inducing the consent of others by force, propaganda, and other nonrational pressures, and inducing their consent by the force of evidence and persuasion. The difference in the two situations is reflected in the attitude of the subjects compelled by the force of the fist (or fraud) as distinct from the compulsion of argument to which one yields. In the first case we resent the exercise of power as invading our autonomy; in the second, we are conscious of no invasion of autonomy. In the case of an inquiry in which several conflicting claims are being negotiated by experiment and analysis, when one reaches a common conclusion with others in consequence of the outcome of the process of inquiry, one feels not a submission to another person's will but to an objective state of affairs which all who are sincerely in quest of the truth must acknowledge.

For these reasons it seems to me altogether implausible to interpret all attempts at communication as attempts to dominate others, and completely unjustifiable to present the scientific method of resolving doubt and fixing belief as comparable in any significant way with the familiar modes of exercising power over others by the gun, by money, by status, or by brass

bands and other forms of blandishment. If thought and its expression were primarily an effort to exercise power over others the very concept of "objectivity" would become unintelligible. Thought would then be judged in terms of its success rather than its accuracy, and prevailing lies would be thought more legitimate than suppressed truths.

Usually some narrow and partisan interest couples the attack on historical objectivity with a completely new reading of the past. Nothing illustrates my point so well as the recent attempts to rewrite the history of the Cold War in order to establish either that the United States and the Soviet Union were equally responsible for the Cold War or that the United States was chiefly, if not completely, responsible for it.

Here is not the place to argue the point that if there had not been a Cold War to combat Soviet expansion, the world would have been engulfed in a hot war, or its free areas swallowed by a totalitarian despotism. But I cannot forego mentioning the stubborn facts that make a shambles of this mythical reconstruction of the past. First, the fact that after the Second World War, the United States withdrew its armed forces from Europe while the Red Army bestrode the continent like a colossus. Instead of withdrawing to its prewar borders, it forcibly imposed minority Communist

regimes on Central and Eastern Europe in crass violation of the treaties that pledged the Kremlin to abide by free elections. Second fact: the United States offered the Marshall Plan to all European nations, even to those in the Communist orbit, to rebuild their economies. It was tentatively accepted by Czechoslovakia and Poland until vetoed by Stalin.

Third and most important fact: when the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb, which would have permitted it to impose its will on any nation, when even the expacifist and anti-American, Bertrand Russell, urged that it be dropped on the Soviet Union, the United States offered to surrender its monopoly to an international authority. The only condition it made was that inspection be undertaken to detect secret violations that might result in the bomb being used against the United States in an atomic Pearl Harbor. Was this a proposal of an imperialist power eager to impose its armed hegemony on the world, as the revisionist historians claim? At any rate, it was a proposal accepted by every major nation of the world except the Soviet Union.

This unhistorical and irrational reinterpretation of the past with its use of double standards is also found in reinterpretations of the domestic scene. It all depends it seems on whose political ox is being gored.

How well I recall the argument about the scope of presidential executive power when Roosevelt committed American destroyers to fire on German submarines in the shipping lanes of the Atlantic and when Truman committed American troops in Korea. The very same persons who took one view then take a quite different view now and discover a constitutional crisis in differences over political issues. The same thing is true of controversies concerning the composition and role of the Supreme Court. It seems evident to me (and I speak as a critic of the present administration's domestic policy—as distinct from its foreign policy) that so long as we have a tripartite system of government, the result of Montesquieu's misreading of the English constitution, and not the more democratic British system which gives supremacy to Parliament or to the legislature, such conflicts of interpretation are inescapable and must be settled by compromise.

I am not so naive as to think that the disorder of our times can be cured merely by building dikes against irrationalism. We need creative intelligence to devise specific policies to modify our institutional practices. But until better thinking prevails in the order and connection of our ideas about social order, as well as about social disorder, the less likely is it that we shall devise the policies required to realize the great promise of American life. □

James Grant

Multinationals and the Limits of Power

Salvador Allende must have known he was among friends. "We are witnessing," he proclaimed before the United Nations General Assembly, "a pitched battle between the great transnational corporations and sovereign states, for the latter's fundamental political and military decisions are being interfered with by world organizations which are not . . . accountable to or regulated by any parliament or institution representing the collective interest. . . ." The delegates gave the speech a seventy-second standing ovation, the Associated Press reported.

The next day—December 5, 1972—the late Chilean president left New York for Moscow (aboard an Aeroflot jetliner via Algeria), returning home by way of Havana. There is no reason to believe that Dr. Allende's speech was inspired by the Soviets or that his stop in Cuba was more than ordinarily sinister.

Remarkable, rather, is the symbolism of it all: the democratically elected socialist leader railing against concentrated economic power (ITT's net worth, Allende grumbled, "is bigger than the national budgets of several Latin American countries put together"), then flying off to confer with men who dictate without check their nation's politics, economics, and art. So it goes: Of private economic power, which without state leverage is finite, it is asked, "How can we control and regulate this power?" But of state power, which is infi-

nite, we ask, "How can we broaden this power?"

John Kenneth Galbraith, the poet laureate of American statism, now urges a dose of socialism for our troubles, never questioning how a yet stronger state might choke individual liberty. (In the scheme of countervailing power, who or what is to hinder the growth of the state? Since 1929, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago reports, government spending on all levels has grown thirty-fold. Combined spending last year reached \$382 billion, one-third of the gross national product.)

A Republican administration decrees wage-price controls, caring nothing for their long-range impact on the rights of property. We greet each new proposal for state intervention only in terms of its "direct and proximate effects," not for its "direct and distant effects," lamented Herbert Spencer more than one hundred years ago. "This is the gravest danger that today threatens civilization," observed Ortega y Gasset in 1932: "State intervention, the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State. . . ."

Nowhere, it seems, has the ambivalence toward power been more visible than in debate over the multinational corporation (defined as a corporation which pursues a global strategy of investment, production, and marketing, enjoying correspondingly high sales and earnings). The AFL-CIO has called the multinational "a modern-day di-

nosaur, which eats the jobs of American workers." One congressional witness charged global corporations with "economic arson," claiming they "pushed the dollar into a new devaluation and drove the price of gold out of sight." In a report widely hailed for its evenhandedness, the United Nations acknowledged the material contributions of multinational corporations even as it stewed over the problem of regulating them: "The power concentrated in their hands, and their actual use of it, their ability to shape demand patterns and values and to influence the lives of peoples and governments . . . have raised concern about their role in world affairs. . . ."

For the charge that multinationals export jobs and undermine American incomes, there appears to be little evidence. In 1971, the UN report estimated U.S. multinationals invested \$4.8 billion abroad in plants, inventory, and equipment, while generating a return flow of \$9 billion in interest, management fees, and other earnings. By 1980, *Fortune* magazine suggests, the return might reach \$20 billion annually. (*Fortune*, in its August issue, also predicted a slowing in the rate of multinational expansion as two of the conditions that nurtured their rise—cheap foreign production costs and high tariff barriers—grow less attractive in the seventies.) The Department of Commerce estimates that foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals shipped back only 7 percent of their output

in 1970. Further, the department told the Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, domestic employment attributed to U.S.-based multinationals grew faster between 1966 and 1970 than other nongovernmental employment.

Yet doubts remain, if not over jobs and income, then certainly over size and market power. The statistics are awesome: multinational corporations, according to the U.S. Tariff Commission, command more than \$250 billion in assets; 200 of them generate annual sales of more than \$1 billion. The United Nations reports that international production—production “subject to foreign control or decision”—surpassed trade as the chief form of international exchange in 1971. What’s more, the UN says, the top 187 multinationals account for one-third of American manufacturing output. In some industries—including automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and fabricated metal products—the proportion exceeds three-quarters.

An important question is that of competition: will natural economic forces prevent the domination of world markets by a handful of corporate conspirators? Will market discipline operate on a global scale among a relatively small number of producers? At least two studies suggest that the answer to these questions is yes. According to an analysis by Stephen Hymer and Robert Hawthorn, mere size seems not to have guaranteed the growth of multinationals between 1957 and 1967. (See Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation*, MIT Press, 1970.) The authors’ data indicate that beyond a certain minimum size—modern research, development, and marketing costs require sizable outlays of capital—growth can petrify, rendering giants vulnerable to smaller, more agile competitors.

Harold Demsetz and Yale Brozen have challenged a warhorse of American anti-

trust doctrine, the idea that market concentration presents a reliable index of monopoly power. In a study published jointly by the American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institution, Professor Demsetz wrote: “New data . . . indicate strongly that the productive efficiency of large firms relative to small firms is correlated with market concentration. (That is, when a few firms control or dominate one market.) This suggests that a policy of compulsory deconcentration of concentrated industries . . . would be likely to reduce productive efficiency in those industries.” More significantly, he notes, recent research shows “correlations between market concentration and various measures of market power to be less persistent and considerably weaker or even nonexistent than in the earlier work.”

But the subject is by no means closed. Even if Professor Demsetz’s data prove iron-clad, the insecurity of states in the face of mobile and efficient private power isn’t likely to diminish. Anthony Sampson paraphrased Harold Geneen, czar of the ITT empire, as declaring his company “above governments, above controls and above morals” (Anthony Sampson, *The Sovereign State of ITT*, Stein and Day, 1973). Stories abound, he wrote, of Geneen putting off the Shah or snubbing the King of the Belgians. (“What do governments know about making jobs?” Geneen asks trenchantly.)

In theory and song, if only occasionally in practice, multinationals wield decisive influence over host-country economic policies. Is Jamaica trying to restrict credit? To what avail if the local branches of multinational banks will not cooperate? Does Liberia want more jobs and more tax revenues? It will have to create the jobs itself if multinational “X” prefers capital-intensive investment. And if Liberia presses the tax question, “X” can peddle its investment in a more hospitable country. (If that is

impractical, “X” can dodge taxes by transferring its earnings to a less heavily taxed corporate branch.)

A story in the *Times* of London (August 17) illustrates how multinational corporations can bargain—and countervail. The story, which quotes from the journal *European Chemical News*, describes industry dissatisfaction over the “unbending principles” of government price decisions: “Continued Government intransigence on chemical price increases could become the sole reason for Britain’s chemical producers concentrating their next round of investment outside the United Kingdom. . . .”

The multinational challenge to sovereignty has captured the UN’s imagination in much the same way that Senator Kennedy’s health care program impressed the American Medical Association. “No single jurisdiction can cope adequately with the global phenomenon of the multinational corporation,” the UN report concedes, “nor is there a (competent) international authority.” The report urges governments to form regional bargaining units, the better to wring concessions from multinationals while offering them larger, more integrated marketing areas. “The more effective economic integration is among member countries,” the UN counsels, “the greater their collective ability to present a countervailing force to multinational corporations.”

But if corporate autonomy worries bureaucrats, it has occasionally encouraged diplomats. The peaceful influence of international trade on foreign relations is one tenet of nineteenth-century liberalism that still enjoys a respectable following. If trade (or foreign manufacturing) reaches sufficient proportions, many reason, conflict will become unthinkable: “Declare dividends, not war.” But as private and public interests began to merge with the expansion of state power, it became apparent—notably to Friedrich A. Hayek—that only trade between individuals serves peace. Profit, he observed, is a far more stable force than nationalism: “If the resources of different nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations as wholes, if international economic relations, instead of being relations among individuals become relations between whole nations organized as trading bodies, they inevitably become the source of friction and envy between whole nations.”

Many wonder whether a corporation that relies on the advice of the Commerce Department and the backing of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation can really be called its own agent. (Sampson writes of ITT’s need to convince governments that Washington stands behind it at the bargaining table.) A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee has recommended that OPIC’s operations be transferred to private insurers to reduce the likelihood of governmental meddling on behalf of American corporations. The UN has similarly urged governments to renounce foreign economic intervention. But whether such forbearance is possible for a socialist state, one that owns outright a threatened “corporation,” is doubtful.

In light of the warm reception given wage-price controls by the Republic’s businessmen, we might indeed ask whether they have the will, the power, or the desire to resist heightened government control at

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home, what Albert J. Nock called "[the] great redistribution of power between society and the State." The case for property becomes less compelling as business forsakes the boardroom for the lobby, the market for the commission. It is unclear whether multinational corporations have the backbone to resist both expropriation and state-preferred favors—and in the long

run the latter may prove no less destructive to individual rights.

Finally, what of the impact of multinationals on local tradition? Canada's Watkins Report reckoned "the most serious cost . . . resulting from foreign ownership is the intrusion of [foreign] law and policy. Narrowly defeated in the California legislature recently was a bill banning

foreign banks from the state. In this era of monoliths—public and private—there are no easy solutions: Allende caricatured the idea of government even as ITT parodied the notion of property. But in 1973 it is clearly property—and the defenses it affords liberty—that requires sustenance. If uncorrupted by the State, it will serve both our wants and our liberties. □

Carl Gershman

Israel's Fate

It is of some significance that the coordinated offensive launched by the Egyptian and Syrian armies on October 6 was called Operation Saladin. Saladin was the Moslem warrior who defeated the Crusaders in 1187 in a great battle that led to the capture of Jerusalem. The fact that his exploits were chosen as the model for the recent Arab offensive says volumes about Arab psychology and intentions, not to mention Israeli fears.

The Arab goal in this war was the same as Saladin's eight centuries earlier: to expel the infidel from holy Moslem soil. It would be amusing to witness "progressive" secularists in the West go overboard in their support for this Jihad (holy war), were not Israel's survival and the lives of its people so gravely endangered. Sadat, Assad, Faisal, and the rest exercised restraint in the beginning by defining limited objectives for the war: the ejection of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. By the middle of the eighteen-day war, when the tide had begun to turn in Israel's favor, the Arab leaders reverted to form. Syria's Assad said on October 15 that a "war of total liberation" would follow the retaking of the Golan Heights. Sadat emphasized "the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians," a euphemism for the destruction of Israel. These statements are entirely in keeping with the Arab program outlined over the past six years. Sadat and others have defined a two-stage struggle. Stage one, the regaining of the territories, would correct "the 1967 problem." Stage two would correct "the 1948 problem," which of course is the existence of Israel as such.

Israel won the war, though less decisively than she would have had the Great Powers not imposed a cease-fire when they did. Still, Israel occupied more of the Golan and about 750 square miles of the Suez Canal's west bank. The future Arab program, it seems, will now have to be divided into three stages.

There has been some hope expressed that the recent war would move the parties closer to peace. This seems highly unlikely. The Arab offensive may not have destroyed Israel, but it did wipe out the Israeli doves, who are now, like everyone else, calling for secure borders. The mood in Israel is grim and embittered, in contrast to the elation and confidence after the Six Day War. The losses suffered have been heavy, especially for a small country which places tremendous value on every life. (A measure of this value is that a book is produced in Israel

about the life of each soldier killed in combat.) As the postponed Israeli elections approach, there will be very few voices calling for the return of any of the territories occupied in 1967. Israel might be forced by Great Power pressure into making territorial concessions, but it is unlikely she will do so if the Arabs do not meet her half way.

There's the nub of the difficulty, for the Arab leaders still see themselves in the role of Saladin fighting the Crusaders. They have not yet, nor is it clear that they ever will, accept the presence of a non-Arab state in "their" Middle East. They continue to see the Jews as outsiders, foreign invaders, who have no real attachment to the land. This is not a mere misunderstanding that could be corrected by more contact between Arabs and Israelis (though this would help). It is an article of faith in which has been invested Arab dignity, pride, and visions of future grandeur.

Still, a peace of sorts could come to the Middle East were it not for one additional factor, and that is the Soviet Union. Soviet foreign policy is opportunistic in that it exploits whatever opportunities exist for expansion. Senator Henry Jackson has aptly compared the Russians to a thief who walks down a corridor checking all the doorknobs to see if one is open. If he finds one, he walks in. The Arab-Israeli conflict has opened the door of the oil-rich Middle East to the Russians, and they are now burglarizing the region.

The Middle East war has been the first major international conflict in which Russia has been able to throw around her newly-acquired political and military weight. The Russians have not merely armed and trained the Arab armies and provided technicians to man some of the more advanced weapons. All indications are that they helped plan the aggression, and they threatened full-scale intervention when Israel appeared on the verge of victory.

The implications for Nixon's détente policy are not encouraging. During the first week of the war, the United States turned a blind eye to Russian irresponsibility in the hope of salvaging détente. An indication of U.S. accommodation was Secretary of State Kissinger's remark, following inflammatory statements made by Soviet UN Ambassador Malik at the Security Council (Israel, *inter alia*, was said to have "ravaged entire civilizations") that the United States was favorably impressed by "the relative restraint that has been shown in

the public media in the Soviet Union and in the conduct of their representative at the Security Council." As to the restraint in the media, one may observe sarcastically that Kissinger may have been referring to the failure of the Soviets to report anything about their massive resupply of the Arabs.

Kissinger would have us believe that the Administration's détente policy was responsible for preventing the U.S.-Soviet confrontation of October 25 from getting out of hand. A more credible explanation is that it was the American alert—an old-fashioned tactic reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis—that kept the Russians in line. Indeed, the whole problem with our approach to détente is that it has not made use of what Andrei Sakharov has called our "trump cards"—America's economic leverage on Moscow. The Administration might take its cue from the maritime unions which threatened to boycott all ships engaged in trade with Russia if the USSR continued to aid the Arabs. "If the Russians are going to make us cold," the head of the longshoremen's union said, referring to the oil boycott, "we are going to make them hungry." Unfortunately, this is still the only language the Kremlin leaders understand, which makes Moscow's behavior during the war not very surprising and the road ahead for détente quite difficult, if not treacherous.

Still, the Administration's response to the crisis was light-years ahead of the European response, with the exemplary exception of the Dutch. *The Economist* characterized Europe as "trying to shut its eyes to what was at issue (between Russia and America), and then running round in frightened circles because the problem would not go away. It managed to combine the behaviour of the ostrich and the hen." The Europeans no doubt felt that they had to remain neutral or pro-Arab in order to keep the oil flowing. But their vulnerability to blackmail and their blindness to the long-term implications of Soviet audacity and western division are certainly among the most distressing developments to come out of the October crisis.

From Israel's point of view, the war showed a frightening erosion of international support. Almost everyone ganged up on Israel. About ten Arab countries joined the fighting, aided directly by the Russians, the North Vietnamese (who advised the Syrians), the North Koreans (whose pilots flew missions for the Egyptians), the French (whose Mirages, sold to Libya, were

used against Israel on the Sinai front), and the British (who trained Egyptian helicopter pilots). Virtually every African country has now broken diplomatic relations with Israel, despite what a Kenyan newspaper described as the impressive record of Israeli aid programs to Africa which "have been more successful than those of most of the major and richer nations." Spain, whose prime minister has said that the aim of the Jews is to destroy Christian civilization, declared its "unshakable friendship" with the Arabs. India also lined up solidly with the Arabs who have opposed India in all of its three wars with Pakistan. Of course the entire Moslem world, responding to the declaration of the Jihad, was up in arms, and one holy "act of war" was committed as far away as Malaysia where it is reported that the American embassy was burned.

When Malik denounced Israel as an "international gangster" and stormed out of the Security Council, the delegates in at-

tendance gave him an ovation. As one American civil rights leader observed, the UN showed some resemblance to a southern lynch mob.

If anything constructive came out of this terrible war and the depressing events surrounding it, it is that some gravely mistaken ideas about international affairs have been shot out of the water. Few people took Soviet novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn very seriously last year when he condemned "the spirit of Munich" in the West and chastised the "timorous civilized world [which], faced with the onslaught of a suddenly revived and snarling barbarism, has found nothing to oppose it with except concessions and smiles." Now commentators are comparing the fourth Arab-Israeli war to the Spanish civil war—a local war in which the world's major totalitarian power tested out its new weapons which, in the future, could be directed against the "timorous" West. It's clear who's playing the role

of Hitler, and there are a number of actors competing for the part of Neville Chamberlain. Several years ago such a picture of the world would have been dismissed as a Cold War relic; now it appears even to many liberals to be distressingly accurate.

A leading Israeli Socialist, a left-winger in his own country, recently said in a speech before a New York audience that it was an "honor" for Israel to be in the vanguard of the struggle against the new totalitarian menace. In a sense it is an honor, as it was to fight fascism, though it is one Israel accepts reluctantly, albeit courageously. She simply has no choice if she wants to live. It would be a far better world were Israel not thrust so mercilessly into this role, a fate Israel's founders did not conceive for the remnant of Nazi barbarism. Yet it is a fate that might be given some meaning if the West, stirred by Israel's example, can regain the moral vision without which democratic civilization cannot survive. □

J. Tim Fennell

Soviet Ambitions in the Mideast

The "era of negotiation" is upon us. The Nixon years, as we move into a period of international politics that is quite distinct from the postwar era of containment and bipolar confrontation, have surely become a watershed in American diplomacy. President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized that the primary foreign policy objective of the remaining years of his administration will be the consolidation of a "structure of peace." But what, one may well ask, are the objectives of the other superpower, the Soviet Union, in this new era? And, in addition, are there areas of tension which might still lead to confrontation? The answer to these two vital questions will largely determine the success or failure of attempts to erect a "structure of peace."

The most recent Arab-Israeli war emphasizes that the greatest potential source of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is the Middle East. The extensive Soviet resupplying of the Egyptian and Syrian armies during the course of the war threatened to destroy the new super power "détente." Consequently, the aspirations of the Soviet Union in the region are of manifest importance. However, Soviet policy in the Middle East is not made in a vacuum; it is, I believe, part of a general pattern of Soviet global intentions. I will speculate on the nature of Moscow's global policy and attempt to illustrate how Soviet Middle Eastern activities are part of a much larger pattern of concerns.

The discussion will involve two dimensions: what may be called political or diplomatic objectives, and strategic or military objectives. In reality, of course, while a distinction is analytically useful, military and political interests blend together and act upon each other.

The Political

Eastern Europe and China are the two

areas given top priority in Soviet national policy considerations. Eastern Europe is of fundamental importance for three reasons. First, it represents a spectacular "gain for socialism." A frequent theme in the statements of Soviet leaders and the press is the need to protect "the gains of socialism." Second, Eastern Europe provides access to and a buffer between the Soviet Union and a dismembered Germany. The historical reasons for Soviet preoccupation with Germany are well known. Third, the Kremlin probably perceives that the undermining of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe will lead to upheavals within the Soviet Union itself.

The Middle East can be related to Eastern Europe in several ways. The first is what Uri Ra'an identifies as the "doctrine of irreversibility," or what has been more generally known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine." (*The Israel-Arab Reader*: New York, Bantam, 1969.) The doctrine is rooted in the Leninist concept of "proletarian internationalism" and was invoked by Khrushchev to justify the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Brezhnev became identified with the doctrine following a November 1968 speech in which he professed that the Czech intervention was undertaken in the name of the "class struggle" and "proletarian internationalism" in order to "protect the gains of socialism." This is a Soviet version of the "domino theory." Once a state joins or is associated with the "socialist commonwealth" it cannot slip "backwards" into a neutral or prowestern position. A number of Middle Eastern states, e.g., Egypt, have been associated with the socialist camp. A Soviet defeat or setback in the Middle East might reverberate to Eastern Europe. Ra'an argues that the 1967 Arab defeat and the Soviet response (or rather lack of response) signaled to the dissidents in Eastern

Europe (particularly Czechoslovakia) that Soviet influence could be rolled back without Moscow taking military action, i.e., that Soviet credibility had been undermined. (The doctrine may also have important implications should a Leninist regime ever establish itself in the Middle East.) The war of last fall has probably not had the same effect for at least two reasons. First, less Soviet prestige was involved as a result of the partial expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt in the summer of 1972 and the withdrawal of advisors from Syria a few days prior to the Arab offensive. And second, the Soviets, through a massive airlift of materials, gave strong and immediate support to their Arab clients, which they had not done during the 1967 conflagration.

There are reports that many in Rumania and Yugoslavia believe that continued foreign policy independence is contingent on a general détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the resultant relaxation of tensions in the Middle East. A Yugoslav Middle East "expert" has observed that the departure of Soviet troops from Egypt would be "a great relief for everybody in or near the Mediterranean." The October War undoubtedly caused great consternation in Belgrade and Bucharest.

China, on the other hand, poses different problems. The first problem is the challenge to Soviet leadership within the socialist camp. The second is the seemingly implacable Chinese animosity. The third relates to the geographic proximity of China. Chinese territorial claims, and the pressures of a population which may reach a billion by the year 2000, alarm the Soviets. The Soviets believe the Chinese-American *rapprochement* poses a significant danger to their global position. The decision to proceed with the Moscow summit—

despite the mining of North Vietnamese ports—may well indicate great preoccupation with the Chinese threat.

The Middle East relates to the problem of China in terms of what might be designated "containment." The 1970s have seen the ideological overtones of the conflict deemphasized in favor of a more explicit concern with the traditional political and economic interests which cause disputes among states. The shift in focus is reflected in an increasing competition for influence among non-Communist governments. The Soviets compete with China for influence among the "progressive forces" in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Middle East,

by providing comparatively quick naval access to East Africa and South Asia, is also a valuable geopolitical link in the encirclement of China. At present Soviet naval vessels showing the flag in the Indian Ocean travel from Vladivostok. American officials traveling in the Middle Kingdom have reported a pronounced Chinese fear of Soviet encirclement (Evans and Novak, *Los Angeles Times*, August 4, 1972).

The Soviet Union and China are competing for influence in most of black Africa. Chinese naval vessels have cruised the Indian Ocean, and Peking is helping Tanzania construct a naval base. Brezhnev, in June 1968, proposed the creation of a Sovi-

et-backed Asian security system. A Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation has been concluded with India. Article IX of the Treaty stipulates that in the event of "an attack or threat thereof" there will take place "mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries." The Soviets have acquired a series of repair facilities and anchorages stretching from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, India, Ceylon, and Singapore. Diplomatic ties have been maintained with Indonesia, thus fostering good relations with a Chinese rival. Melvin Gurtov, a Rand Corpora-

Prophets and Profits

Life is unfair. Saints suffer and sinners prosper and there is no use brooding about it. But occasionally there is so conspicuous an incongruity in the rewards of life, so random an apportionment of pleasure and pain, that, try as one might, one cannot wrench the mind's eye away from it. Consider the sickening contrast between the situation of two writers much in the news these days.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn is the greatest living Russian writer, a giant in the tradition of Tolstoy. Norman Mailer works hard to be the most publicized American writer. He is a moneygrubber in the Bobby Riggs tradition, but he lacks Riggs' cheerful self-knowledge.

Everything Solzhenitsyn writes enriches our civilization. Mailer is a one-shot wonder, like Bob Belinski, the miscreant who pitched a no-hitter in his first game and made the rest of his career a study in self-degradation, substituting bufoonery for achievement. Mailer's first novel, *The Naked and the Dead* (1948), was superb. Other than that, however, he has not produced a scrap of higher caliber fiction in a quarter of a century.

Solzhenitsyn has been driven against his inclination to have a "public" life beyond his art. He is fighting a deadly serious war of nerves and gestures against Soviet tyranny. His running battle against the tyrants is an example of a bravery that can barely be understood by those of us who were born free.

Mailer hangs around prize fighters, brawls on the Dick Cavett Show with Gore Vidal, and fancies himself very brave. He has raised hairy-chestedness to a metaphysical principle: I sweat, therefore I am. Although Solzhenitsyn's fiction bears the mark of his hideous experiences with a sadistic regime, he is almost bashful about it. He reminds us that others who suffered more cannot testify. Mailer is not bashful. His writings, now a degeerate form of "journalism," celebrate the tribulations of the Author as Drunk, the Author Levitating the Pentagon, the Author Solving the "Murder" of the Movie Star.

One of Solzhenitsyn's most recent publications is his Nobel Prize accep-

tance lecture. It is among the most eloquent political statements of the century. If it is not the most important, that is because its intended audience—the western public—is preoccupied with trivialities like Mailer.

Mailer's latest work is a sleazy, slovenly, dishonest exploitation of Marilyn Monroe. It is in a nip-and-tuck battle with Jacqueline Susann's latest epic for the reading public's dollars. Mailer's book will make him a million dollars.

Alimony laws make the costs of serial monogamy steep, so Mailer wrote *Marilyn* with an eye cocked on his former wives' lawyers. So he conjured up some lurid lies about a dead Kennedy and a CIA plot to "explain" the Monroe suicide as murder. In his Nobel lecture Solzhenitsyn says: "Archaeologists have uncovered no early stages of human existence so primitive that they were without art." Yes, but Mailer, America's primitive, is doing his best in that direction.

There is a constant whine in Mailer's omnipresent voice. He says *Time* magazine's cover made him look ridiculous. He says the critics should stop using the word "plagiarism" to describe his borrowings from other books about Monroe. For Mailer, life is real, life is earnest.

There is no whine from Solzhenitsyn, risen from the living dead of Soviet prisons: "To reach this chair from which the Nobel lecture is delivered . . . I have mounted not three or four temporary steps, but hundreds or even thousands, fixed, steep, covered with ice, out of the dark and cold where I was fated to survive, but others, perhaps more talented, stronger than I, perished." But Solzhenitsyn, devoid of self-pity, has prison to worry about, not *Time* magazine covers.

It might be nice if, as a kind of cultural exchange, we could trade Mailer and a utility infielder to the Soviets for Solzhenitsyn. That would get even for the grain deal. But Solzhenitsyn would not leave Russia. His art is rooted in a palpable love of country, a contagious, inspiring love that causes fear and trembling in the regime now in its fifty-sixth year of tormenting that country. Solzhenitsyn would not leave Russia because he is committed to using his art

to defend the dignity of the Russian people.

Mailer would not leave the United States because he is passionately—and, to give the devil his due, candidly—committed to using his skills, such as they are, to line his pockets. As Mailer said in justifying *Marilyn*, he needs the money.

Solzhenitsyn says literature is "the living memory of a nation." Mailer, having long ago abandoned literature, hawks his wounded ego on talk shows while promoting a book about a tawdry Hollywood episode that should be trivial in the nation's memory but, alas, is not.

In *The First Circle* Solzhenitsyn says:

"Aren't writers supposed to teach, to guide? . . . And for a country to have a great writer—don't be shocked, I'll whisper it—is like having another government. That's why no regime has ever loved great writers, only minor ones."

Mailer, who considers himself a radical and a threat to the established order, is, in fact, like most food for base appetites, an enervating opiate. He raises no awkward questions, offers no troubling visions. I expect some American regime will give him the Medal of Freedom.

Solzhenitsyn's cry is: "Woe to the nation whose literature is cut off by the interposition of power." And woe to the nation whose literary lions, strutting and grubbing on television, are nothing more than servants of commercial publishing powers.

To give the devils their due, the Soviet tyrants, their regime based on the denial of human dignity, are correct in considering Solzhenitsyn subversive. Mailer, his dignity invested in *Marilyn*, is simply irrelevant to the course of American society.

Isn't it ironic?

Mailer, who lusts to be the most public of writers, has no public-spirited purpose, only a frivolous public persona. Solzhenitsyn, who knows there is an inherent tension between the private nature of creation and the demands of any public role, is compelled against his artist's nature to play a public role of breathtaking grandeur.

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George Will

tion analyst, has observed that "the Chinese leaders believe that they are the principle target of Soviet penetration into Southeast Asia . . . Moscow has done nothing to discourage the belief." The world—should Taiwan lose confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend her from Peking—might well see a Moscow-Taipei defense association. This would in a sense "close the ring" around China. It is known that Victor Louis held discussions with Nationalist leaders in late 1968. And the new airfields which the Nationalists are ostensibly constructing in the hopes of attracting American B-52s could easily accommodate the new generation of Soviet Backfire bombers.

Penetration of the Middle East by the Soviet Union is also related to what can be termed the Great Power syndrome. Since at least the fourteenth century Russia has been an expansionist power. While the expansion has usually been cautious and opportunistic, Russian horizons have increasingly broadened. Khrushchev, in abandoning Stalin's "two camp" theory, designated the "third world" as the "zone of peace." The developing nations were now appropriate objects for cultivating Soviet influence.

The Soviets have explicitly rejected the traditional belief that Russia is exclusively a land power with interests confined to contiguous territories: " . . . attempts to present the United States as a 'sea power' and the U.S.S.R. as only a 'land power' are based on outmoded dogmas . . ." (*Pravda*, July 17, 1971). Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Navy, speaks of Soviet sailors " . . . honorably carrying the Red Starred flag across the seas and oceans of our planet . . ." The Admiral further observes that the Soviet fleet will eventually be capable of " . . . dealing crushing blows to an enemy's fleet in remote parts of the various oceans. . . ."

A "Great Power," from the Soviet perspective, has global interests. Gromyko indicates: "Equal rights at all sectors and in all spheres of activity in the international arena, including the adoption of measures to protect the vital interests of the Soviet Union, its allies and friends; no discrimination in world trade; freedom of navigation for our ships and fleets . . . all determine our possibilities and responsibilities in world affairs." The Brezhnev-proposed Asian Security Conference may have been a signal that the Soviet Union now considers itself an important Asian power.

Soviet decision makers, having developed global political pretensions, are now developing the requisite military capability to match. Roman Kilkowicz, a leading authority on the Soviet military, observes that "the Soviet military leaders have never, in the half-century of the history of their country, commanded a more formidable armed force; never enjoyed such a strong political position at home; never been that powerful vis-à-vis the West." Once again Admiral Gorshkov: "As the economic might of the Soviet Union grows, its interests are extending more and more to seas and oceans, and new demands are therefore made upon the navy for defending these interests. . . ."

The Strategic

The current thrust of Soviet military doctrine seems to be in the direction of developing a theory of "flexible response." Stalin's concept of theater warfare has been fused with Khrushchev's preoccupation with a general global war. Kolkowicz postulates that " . . . what we have today in the Soviet Union is in many ways a radical change in their attitude to warfare. This has persuaded them to consider theater warfare, limited warfare, and naval warfare as something operationally plausible in terms of capabilities feasible." The Red Mediterranean fleet numbered approximately twenty-five vessels in 1966. Today the fleet is comprised of forty-five to fifty units and at times has grown to seventy. About half the fleet consists of



combat vessels. There are usually twelve Soviet submarines patrolling between Port Said and Gibraltar. The combat strength of the flotilla, however, does not nearly match the Sixth Fleet at this time. Indeed, both the French and Italian navies are equal to the Soviet Mediterranean force. The Red Fleet is very deficient in air cover, though air bases in the radical Arab states could potentially compensate for this. Six TU-16 Badger medium bombers, armed with Kennel missiles, had been sent to Egypt prior to the partial Soviet expulsion in July 1972. Such missiles are designed primarily for use against ships.

The Red navy in the eastern Mediterranean probably has three objectives. The first is related to the general drive for strategic parity with (if not superiority to) the United States. The naval force might serve as a counter to the Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean and the tactical (but from the Soviet perspective strategic) nuclear warfare capability of the Sixth Fleet carriers: " . . . the Sixth Fleet is stationed in this area . . . in order to control lines of communication passing through the zone of the Black Sea, as well as to strike at enemy targets from sea and air with nuclear and conventional weapons, and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are designated as the principal enemy" (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 12, 1968).

The second objective involves Albania and Yugoslavia. In the event of Soviet military intervention (perhaps if there is domestic turmoil after Tito's death) the Mediterranean fleet could discourage or even interdict any NATO attempt to render aid to Yugoslavia.

The third objective pertains directly to the Middle East and North Africa. The Soviets perceive that a political obstacle to direct American military intervention has been erected: "The very presence of Soviet

ships in the Mediterranean prevents the U.S. Sixth Fleet from carrying out the Pentagon's aggressive designs with impunity, from running things here as uncereemoniously as it used to" (Admiral Smirnov in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 12, 1968). John C. Campbell, a former American diplomat, asserts that "it is an open Russian boast that we could not now repeat the Lebanon landing of 1958 because their fleet would be in the way, and we would, therefore, be deterred from doing so."

The Soviet naval buildup, in conjunction with growing neo-isolationist tendencies in the United States, may have an added psychological impact. The Middle East and North African nations might perceive that western power is waning while Soviet power represents the wave of the future.

The Red Fleet also raises the morale of the radical Arab states and serves as a deterrent (though to an extent very difficult to estimate) to Israeli "aggressive designs." A contingent of marines (i.e., "naval infantry") assigned to the helicopter carriers, in the event of some Arab upheaval, could intervene in a radical state to restore order or tip a struggle for power in favor of a particular faction. Large scale amphibious assault maneuvers were staged on the Kola Peninsula in 1968 and 1970.

A strong position in the Middle East can serve several Russian strategic interests. Ten TU-16 reconnaissance aircraft, operating from bases in Egypt, regularly surveyed the Sixth Fleet prior to the events of July 1972. The Soviets have jumped over the "northern tier" to establish themselves in the radical states to the south of Turkey and Iran. This, in conjunction with a strong naval presence, facilitates the manifest Soviet objective of moving Turkey and Iran to a position of neutrality.

The Middle East is a key geopolitical region providing access to other areas and potential naval bases. In view of Soviet global aims, this is significant. Moscow enjoys docking and repair facilities at Latakia and Tartus in Syria. The former French base at Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria, is believed to be where major repairs are made—there are even reports, denied by the Algerians, that the base has been turned over to the Soviets. (Prior to the summer of 1972, Port Said, Alexandria, Mersa Matruh, and Salum in Egypt were also open to the Soviets.)

The Soviet Union is the dominant Great Power along the 1200-mile length of the Red Sea, and this could be of great importance if and when the Suez Canal is reopened. Access to East Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf would be eased and the Soviets would thus be closer to the encirclement of China. In addition, the detection of Polaris submarines operating in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf would be facilitated.

Soviet ships have repair facilities at Hodeida in Yemen and Aden in South Yemen. Soviet technicians have also expanded and modernized the port of Mogodisha in Somali. The separatist movement in Eritrea is supported by the Soviet client state of Syria. The Ethiopian army has captured from the rebels many weapons of Eastern European and Soviet manufacture. The sole remaining western outpost in the Red Sea is the French colony of Djibouti. Should the French withdraw there would probably

be open warfare between Ethiopia and Soviet-supported Somali for control of Djibouti. Within the Persian Gulf the Soviets are given access to the Iraqi port of Basra.

Some analysts believe the Soviet Union is not interested in acquiring permanent bases or repair facilities. Self-contained flotillas, however, require the maintenance of "fleet trains." Such "fleet trains" are very expensive and make major repairs difficult. Ship servicing and repairs at sea are very arduous and physically exhausting. The utility of bases in implementing "flexible response" has also been amply demonstrated by the United States in Korea and Vietnam. T.R. Miller has astutely observed: "Strategy in an extensive oceanic environment does not involve control of the sea itself, but of specific points of importance in and around it, of access to and routes between them for the purposes of trade or acquisition of supplies, or the movement of military forces, or maintaining communications."

The cutoff last October of Arab oil supplies to the United States emphasizes that when one is contemplating the strategic significance of the Middle East, one immediately thinks of oil. There are at present four sources of energy available to a modern society: coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear power plants. The Middle East (including Algeria and Libya) provides 50 percent of Western Europe's total energy needs and 80 percent of its oil. By 1980 imports from Nigeria and the development of the North Atlantic might reduce the total to roughly 70 percent. The dwindling coal supply has only been partially compensated by natural gas from the North Atlantic. This necessitates the importation

of gas from the Soviet Union. William Smith asserts that "... in the near future a large part of Western Europe will be linked to the widely spread Soviet gas grid" (*New York Times*, July 21, 1970). West Germany imports 7.5 percent of its natural gas and Italy 25 percent from the Soviet Union. The Soviets also supply 6.5 percent of Western Europe's oil. Only Great Britain will have atomic energy available by 1980, but this will provide only 6 percent of her total requirement. The North Sea alone could provide for all of Western Europe's oil (at the present rate of consumption) for only about one and a half years. Clearly Western Europe will continue to be heavily dependent on the Middle East, and to a certain extent on the Soviet Union, in the foreseeable future. And more specifically Western Europe will be dependent on the Persian Gulf due to North Africa's inadequate reserves.

The Suez Canal has not been made obsolete by the construction of huge tankers: 75 percent of the world's tankers can still travel through the Canal (though some would require ballast). The Canal also has not reached its optimum size. Plans for enlargement were disrupted by the 1967 war.

The combined dependence on the Middle East and the Soviet Union for vital energy resources must be an important element in the future political calculations of Western Europe and the United States. (It should also be kept in mind that approximately 80 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East and the Soviets wish to export natural gas to Japan.) Were the Soviets to realize a sphere of influence in the Middle East, a great deal of pressure could be

brought to bear on Western Europe. At present the Soviet objective of promoting détente in Europe would preclude such provocative action. However, a shift in Soviet policy in the late 1970s is not to be lightly disregarded.

Conclusion

Soviet involvement in the Middle East must be attributed in a very general sense to strategic-geopolitical factors. The development of a flexible response capability requires a strong Middle East presence because of the access it provides to other areas. Flexible response enhances what I believe to be the Soviet objective of containing or encircling China and also makes manifest what can be called Soviet Great Power aspirations. The Soviet decision makers, if not seeking immediate imperial aggrandizement, apparently perceive that Great Powers have global interests and concerns. Accordingly, they will try to strengthen their position in the Middle East while simultaneously expelling western, particularly American, influence. The recent war may make this easier for at least two reasons. First, Cairo and Damascus will be heavily dependent on Moscow for resupplying and retraining their armies. Second, due to its strong support of Israel, America's prestige has been dealt a severe blow. (Even such a staunch ally as Saudi Arabia felt compelled to stop oil shipments to the United States.)

Will the goals of the Soviets ultimately frustrate President Nixon's efforts to erect a "structure of peace"? This may well be the paramount foreign policy issue of the next few years. □

Benjamin Stein

Nixon: His Friends and His Enemies

Spiro Agnew made a big mistake in his attack on the press in 1970. He should have omitted the word "effete" from "an effete corps of impudent snobs." Unfortunately for the rest of the country, that particular body of men and women wield power far greater than anyone, including the corps itself, dreamed. They are on the verge of doing something never before done in this country (although done in other countries in other times). Through the manipulation of the organs of mass communication in a concerted attack whose coordination and imagination would make the Beaverbrooks and Hearsts seem like pikers, the corps is close to taking over the government, including all three branches, from the people who were lawfully elected to it.

What is happening is a long drawn-out coup, by which a small but powerful group of people are subverting the expressed will of the majority and are making the majority believe that their will is being done. To see clearly what is being done, one must look back to at least 1968.

In that year the United States had several major *real* problems. There were over a half a million Americans fighting in

Vietnam, in a conflict which appeared to be thoroughly meaningless to many people. A generation gap had opened which seemed to be unbridgeable, and whose outward signs included violent demonstrations in many forums, a feeling of contempt for democratic processes among the young, and huge differences in articulated thoughts about morality, especially about sex and drugs.

Racial antagonism was running high as a result of continuing legacies of repression of blacks by whites and a new reign of terror in cities being visited upon all by blacks. Twelve years after the desegregation decision, millions of people wondered if desegregation had to include large-scale busing of "little children from here to kingdom come" and the destruction of public education which often followed.

There was also tremendous concern over the felt conviction that the idle poor were being subsidized by forced transfers from the working lower-middle class.

Finally, but very importantly, there was apprehension about what was then believed to be the excessively high rate of inflation.

On these issues, there was a consistent differing between Richard Nixon and his opponent, and most particularly, between Richard Nixon and Hubert H. Humphrey's most articulate supporters. Nixon consistently took the line favored by lower-middle class and upper class people, while Humphrey, and especially his supporters, consistently took the line of the middle class, upper-middle class, and poor people.

Specifically, Nixon criticized Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the war, but wanted to maintain American honor and strength in confrontation with the Communists. He took a hard line on international confrontations in general, but promised eventual withdrawal from Vietnam.

In the conflict between the old and the new morality, Nixon invariably sided with the old morality, especially in calling for tough action against drugs and student demonstrations, and most of all, in his own rather old-fashioned and corny demeanor and speech.

In the conflict between blacks and whites about busing and about welfare, Nixon always took the hard hat position against

busing and for a crackdown on what were called welfare chiselers.

On crime, both candidates took firm positions, but Nixon was able to make his position seem tougher through more adroit discussion. The same was true on inflation.

On all those issues, Nixon was opposed violently by the liberal, upper-middle class people who control the dissemination of views on network television and in most of the famous newspapers and magazines. Those people wanted a softer line on busing, welfare, anything to do with race, and a complete and unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam. Also important was having a less stodgy president than they thought Nixon would be.

Of course, Nixon won. As President, he followed his mandate by actions which were popular among the lower-middle masses but utterly repellent to the more elevated, more educated, and perhaps even occasionally more correct upper-middle classes.

As President, he lingered far too long for their taste in Vietnam. He shocked many by giving special consideration to the case of Lieutenant William Calley. He infuriated others by asking for legislation to limit busing. He offended some sensitive and decent people by praising those who attacked student demonstrators.

He did other things too, such as open relations with China, and he improved relations with the Soviets, which won universal praise, but also some criticism from liberals who felt cheated that a man whom they hated should have done something great which they had been saving for themselves. In his economic policies, the President acted with a mixture of expedience and principle. His actions against inflation were often criticized, but no responsible alternatives were suggested.

In general, then, Nixon acted as the agent of the large constituency which had elected him.

In 1972, the issues were far more sharply drawn than in 1968. Senator George McGovern painted himself into a corner of extreme liberalism beloved by his upper-middle class followers (who paid for his campaign far more lavishly than had Humphrey's supporters in 1968), but shared by few others in the country except the poor and the black.

Far more than Humphrey, McGovern assumed the mantle of candidate of the poor, the students, liberated women, and those remnants of the New Left who voted.

The issues were basically the same however—the conflict between lower-middle class values and upper-middle class values remained central. And at the vortex of that center, immensely more clearly than in 1968, was the issue of Richard M. Nixon himself. Again and again, Senator McGovern made the most stinging attacks on the President personally, calling him a "bumbling, bugging burglar," likening him to Hitler, and repeatedly saying "The main issue in this whole campaign is Richard M. Nixon."

Again, Nixon took the point of view of the hard hats on real issues—against unilateral disarmament, against busing, against what were thought to be excessive welfare payments, against the new morality. On the issue of himself, Richard Nixon remained largely silent.

Of course, Nixon received a staggeringly large mandate to continue doing what he had been doing and, if the central issue really was Richard Nixon himself, the voters were obviously telling him to continue being himself.

Again, Nixon responded to his mandate and continued to do things which infuriated the supporters of McGovern and others who had an upper-middle class, liberal, "swinging" point of view. He continued to be corny and stodgy. He made enormous ballyhoo out of the return of the POWs. He had girls in miniskirts sing at a reception for Brezhnev when ankle-length was in fashion in New York. He was still bowling and watching football games.

But Senator McGovern had taught Nixon's enemies some things, and they knew how to use that knowledge. They had lost consistently on real issues, so they created a false issue with an unparalleled barrage of false statements and misleading inferences.



Senator McGovern had taught them something else too. He had done something almost incredibly shocking and had gotten away with it. He had said that Richard Nixon was like Hitler. There was almost no outcry at that calumny, and although the remark had not won the election for McGovern, the reaction to it had shown that Nixon could be called absolutely anything, no matter how evil or untrue, without any reproach to the speaker.

So, when a trickle, then a steady stream of accusations against the President started to appear in connection with Watergate, the people who had been on the losing side about real issues for so long were given an opportunity to try out what they had learned.

They simply severed completely the last fraying threads that bound their remarks about Nixon to reality. They had learned that they could not destroy Nixon on any real issue or issues. In any real sense, Nixon's legitimacy on the issues was unquestionable. He was a certain kind of person, elected to do certain things, by a large

majority, and he did them. But Nixon's enemies could still destroy Nixon by carrying much further what Senator McGovern began. And they never questioned that it was their right to try to usurp by unfair means the power which had been given to Nixon by the people by constitutional procedures.

They made Richard Nixon the central issue and then created a Nixon that did not really exist to be the loser on that issue.

Unsubstantiated charges from unnamed sources were the prime ingredients in creating the monster which Nixon's enemies called Nixon. Giving full credence to the accusations of a confessed perjurer, thief, and conspirator like John Dean while dismissing with sneers the remarks of men of impeccable background like John D. Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman was a powerful beginning. The commentators learned that they could say the names of Nixon's supporters with the same contempt they used for Nixon's own name, and the names would begin to sound just as scatological.

Nixon's enemies on television and in the print media learned that if they quoted unnamed sources with a tone of great sincerity, unsubstantiated charges would look far more substantial than unreported, substantiated denials from the President.

They learned that if they acted outraged when reporting something perfectly normal or irrelevant, viewers would believe the legitimate and the irrelevant outrageous.

Those who had always loathed the "square" Nixon who catered to the lower-middle class found that if they called Nixon a criminal often enough, and called anyone who defended him a criminal, gradually defenders would become intimidated. It takes a brave man to risk being accused of crimes in a national newsmagazine, no matter how false the charges, as recompense for his loyalty to the man and the program who were elected by two-thirds of the voters. So leading Republican politicians began to keep their mouths shut, and the President became isolated in the public eye.

Far more important, the television and newspaper aristocracy eventually realized that their power over the information of the average American was so enormous that they could eliminate even the voice of the President himself from serious consideration. They could appear before and after his speeches and press conferences and make up a whole new series of "reports from reliable sources" and erroneous implications about the President so as to completely blot out any appeal which the President might have had. Nixon's enemies saw that what they said became the news.

The enemies of Nixon are now operating in a realm in which they have complete control. There is no objective thing the President can do to show the people he is still the man they elected and wanted to govern them. The whole debate is not on real grounds any longer. It is not about war or peace, or prosperity or depression. Those are tangible things over which a president and a government have some measure of control. But the issue now is whether the President is an honest, competent, and sane man.

The enemies of the President have been

telling the American people every day since March that the President is a criminal. There is literally no proof that he is, but that becomes an irrelevancy as the enemies of Nixon control all input to the American people. Gradually the sum of innumerable unsubstantiated charges and contemptuous tones becomes a fact itself—although severed from all connection with the truth. The lies become so widespread that they are their own truth.

Nixon's alleged criminality becomes proof of his incompetence. No one can seriously claim that he has handled the real issues incompetently, so again, reference is made to the false Nixon created by the media. Because Nixon is a criminal, he is also incompetent. Never mind that Nixon is not a criminal. Now many people believe him to be a criminal and that is the proof that he is incompetent.

How could he have hidden his essential criminality for so long? In the scheme of Nixon's enemies, Nixon's *seeming* sanity despite his *proved* criminality is a measure


of the cunning of the diseased mind of the man.

Nonfact becomes fact and then supports an endless chain of consequential nonfacts which become facts.

And finally comes the moment of exhilaration when Nixon's enemies make the same discovery that the killers of Charles I made. They have it in their power to kill a king. All of the fury which they have felt at being frustrated by Nixon for so long on real issues, on his having succeeded with the electorate and with problem-solving despite their opposition, reaches a boiling point. They will stop at nothing until they see the object of their scorn reduced to nothing and themselves confirmed in their new power. At that point, and we are in it now, Nixon's enemies disregard every other consideration. The effect of America's world position, the future of a state in which a totalitarian press rules without any responsibility to anyone, the psychic effect of destruction of a government, all melt into insignificance compared to the possibility of at last doing something they

could never do legitimately—to confound the entire democratic process and to make themselves rulers in a way they could not do according to any rules of law or decency.

Today, it is not only Nixon who is at the brink. It is the whole future of a free society basing its political decisions upon some measure of truth and implementing them through constitutionally prescribed means. Although Nixon's enemies in the media do not see it, they are also on the precipice. If they continue to act without responsibility except to themselves and continue to have complete control over public opinion, no government will be able to function. And surely some future government will decide that if the choice is between government by the president and Congress and government by a self-selecting elite of media barons and baronesses, it is the greatly abused freedom of the press which must go to the wall. Richard Nixon, because of his corny belief in the Constitution, will not be the one to take that step, but it will become inevitable for someone. □



"Few Die and None Resign"

(WASHINGTON)—President Nixon was dealt his first defeat by Congress, after eight earlier attempts to override presidential vetoes had failed. The veto which Congress overrode by thirteen votes in the Senate (75-18) and by four votes in the House (284-185) prompted Senator John Tower (R-Texas) to state: "I realize this is a time when everyone can with impunity kick the President. He's at low ebb."

Congress Reasserts Itself

Had the prestige of the Administration not been so low pitched, the White House could have undoubtedly jawboned three more House members into voting to sustain the veto. But this legislation came at a particularly inopportune time. It was not so much a slap in Nixon's face as it was an attempt on the part of Congress to reassert itself. Thus Republicans like Crane, Bafalis, Ashbrook, Rousellot, Armstrong, and others, who normally can be counted upon by the Administration, felt that the constitutional issues at stake far outweighed any possible public relations damage to the Administration.

House Joint Resolution 542, the War Powers Resolution, now becomes law without the president's signature. It requires the president to come before Congress within forty-eight hours after American

troops have been committed to combat overseas and it compels him to cease operations after sixty days unless Congress has approved his action. Another provision in the legislation (which some critics argue make the resolution unconstitutional) gives Congress the power to order an end to American involvement by passing a concurrent resolution with a simple majority that does not have to be submitted to the president to become effective. Critics of the legislation also felt that the arbitrary language of the resolution would seriously diminish the deterrent value of our armed forces and that it would undermine our national interest, as well as any incentive on the part of a potential adversary to reach an early settlement. There was also concern that the resolution could erode the stature and consistency of American foreign policy, which they argue is necessary if the United States is to remain a credible power.

Talk, Talk, Talk

The most hotly-debated topic in Washington in recent weeks has been whether Nixon should resign or be impeached. White House officials quickly lay to rest the speculation that Nixon might resign, citing his fighting spirit and cool nature. (Even daughter Trish did not recognize her father

from the description!) But the issue has reportedly produced more than 1,000,000 pieces of mail for Capitol Hill. Western Union alone, by October 28, had processed more than 250,000 telegrams to congressional and Senate offices after Nixon fired Special Watergate Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. Although no breakdown is available for all the correspondence received on Capitol Hill, a sample from different offices indicated that those who chose to write were overwhelmingly in favor of resignation or impeachment. Of the 8,000 telegrams received by the Senate Watergate Committee (by the end of October) only 10 were in support of the President; the Special Prosecutor's office received 10,000 telegrams (during the same period) and only a handful were favorable to the President; even the mail received by Senator Goldwater (R-Ariz.) ran 80 to 1 against Nixon.

Senator William Scott (a freshman Republican from Virginia) and an ardent Administration supporter received over 1,000 letters urging the resignation or impeachment of Nixon. The Senator had his staff take a 15 percent sample poll of the anti-Nixon mail and he reported that 77 percent of those who had written calling for impeachment or resignation had voted for George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election. At another time, in different circumstances, the Virginia Republican's revelation might have brought a rallying battle cry—but not now!

Ain't What But How

The efforts to impeach Nixon, throughout, have had a highly ideological and partisan tone, but more recently even supporters of the Administration have favored impeachment proceedings as the quickest way for the President to clear himself. However, until formal charges are levied against Nixon no one really expects the Administration to give this argument any serious thought. The majority of the American public still does not think Nixon should

resign or be impeached (according to a November Gallup Poll the American public opposed removing Nixon from office 54 to 37 percent), and more cautious editorials, including those in the *Washington Post* and the *Wall Street Journal*, have argued that talk of impeachment and resignation is still premature, smacking more of the capricious whim of popularity à la Fourth Republic France, rather than the U.S. Constitution. But if anyone can create the environment conducive to impeachment it is this Administration, and not the left wing of the Democratic Party. Nixon still ignores his experienced politicoes Harlow and Laird, and instead turns to Haig and Ziegler, political novices who still have not learned that it ain't what ya do but how ya do it!

GOP sinking with Nixon?

In an effort to rejuvenate his support among congressional Republicans Nixon spent the first days in November meeting with Republican congressmen and senators, and leading Democrats, but many remained skeptical. This skepticism is in no small part the result of yet another recent public opinion poll taken by Harris at the end of October. According to the Harris Poll the Democrats have a lead of 53 percent to 31 percent in voter preference for the 1974 congressional races. This represents a drop of 8 percent from last spring and it compares poorly to the 56 percent to 44

percent in favor of the Democrats in 1964, the year of the Johnson landslide and the stunning defeat for congressional Republicans.

As a result, many Republicans are urging their colleagues to declare their independence of the White House. Senator Peter Dominick (R-Colo.) in a speech before the Denver Bar Association said, "There can be no more deals and no more technical arguments about evidence. Nothing short of complete disclosure will be adequate to restore the confidence of the American people." In the strongest terms since Bob Dole (R-Kansas) left the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee, dominick went on to say, "The fact that I am devoted to my Party is sufficient reason to speak out. I think Republicans have more reason to be upset about the current state of affairs than anyone else. Frankly, I am damned mad about it. The Republican Party did not get us into this mess. As far as I'm concerned, the working relationship between the Republican Party and this Administration has been tenuous at best for some time. Going back to the congressional elections of 1970, there has been little willingness on the part of the Administration to cooperate with Republican Party leaders, let alone seek their advice. The Administration has pursued its independent course to this juncture. Although our overall goals and policies will probably continue to coincide with those of

the Administration, I believe the Republican Party would be well advised to follow a more independent course from here on. I think a good place to start would be for the Republican Party to take the leadership in resolving the crisis of confidence in our government."

Behold the Irony

But if the Administration's strength still seems to be waning with congressional GOPs, leading southern Democrats have begun rallying around Nixon. This can probably be explained by the fact that Nixon, even after Watergate, still outpolls George McGovern with ease, in some congressional districts by a margin of more than two to one. The all-important chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Edward Hebert (D-La.), recently called Nixon "the strongest President of our time" and fellow Louisiana Democrat, Otto Passman, lashed out at the "radical segment of the news media" and praised Nixon's integrity as "unimpeachable" and his "greatness" as long "established."

One liberal Republican, when told about the increasing Democratic support accruing to Nixon, quipped: "I have said all along the problem with this Administration is that it has behaved as if it were a Democratic one. But unfortunately Republicans just do not have their [the Democrats'] experience at this sort of thing." □

Harold Mott

The Case for Negative Votes

In 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson was elected president in a landslide over Barry Goldwater, getting 61 percent of the popular vote, and yet, four years later, so many of his supporters were deserting that his reelection seemed doubtful. In 1968 Richard Nixon was narrowly elected over Hubert H. Humphrey and George C. Wallace, receiving 44 percent of the popular vote, but in 1972 he in turn won a thumping victory over George McGovern, with 61 percent of the vote. Why did Johnson's voters desert him, and where did Nixon's troops come from? One is tempted to speculate that Johnson never had the support of 61 percent of the electorate and that many voted for him only to insure the defeat of Barry Goldwater, the Mad Bomber. It requires only a little imagination to believe that Nixon had, in fact, as many people for him as did Johnson four years previously and that the 1968 race was close only because Humphrey had fewer people against him than did Goldwater. Unfortunately, these thoughts will remain forever unproven.

I propose here a slight modification of our voting system that can remove this speculative element from future elections and give us all a better estimate of the true popularity of a newly-elected president and his programs. Under the new system the voter will be allowed to vote for candidate A, or for B, or against A or B. The net vote for A will then be the difference of the

number of votes for him and the ones against him. This system puts into practice the expressed wishes of multitudes of voters who seem forever to be choosing the lesser of two evils. Such a system might have been cumbersome in the days of paper ballots, but can be handled with ease by slightly redesigned voting machines.

If we let the number of votes for a candidate be P (for positive) and those against him be N (for negative), his net vote, T, is $T = P - N$. Then it is appropriate to speak of his popularity as the ratio of T to the total votes cast in the election. With this definition of popularity in mind, let us reconsider the 1964 election to see if 61 percent of the voters were with Johnson. Keep in mind the warning that this is sheer speculation. In that election the vote for Johnson (in millions) was $V_1 = 43.0$, and for Goldwater, $V_2 = 27.2$.

Of those who voted for Johnson, perhaps 70 percent were really for him and 30 percent were against Goldwater and would have voted that way if given an opportunity. The same thing could be said about Goldwater's voters. Let's say that 75 percent of his voters were really voting for him and 25 percent were voting against Johnson. Then if voting under the new system had been permitted, Johnson's net vote would have been those votes for him (0.7×43.0) minus the number who voted for Goldwater because of a dislike for Johnson

(0.25×27.2). This would have resulted in a net vote for Johnson of 23.3 million, and we conclude that a true index of his popularity might be $23.3/70.2$ or 33 percent rather than the 61 percent attributed to him. Perhaps if Johnson had considered carefully the significance of such a popularity index, he might have avoided some of the disillusionments of his last years in office.

We may formalize this development by defining confidence factors k_1 and k_2 for the two candidates. If 70 percent of the voters voted for Johnson because of their confidence in him, k_1 would be 70 percent or 0.7. Likewise, if 75 percent had confidence in Goldwater, k_2 would be 0.75. Johnson's net vote, T_1 , would be

$$T_1 = k_1 V_1 - (1 - k_2) V_2$$

where the first term, $k_1 V_1$, represents those voters (70 percent of 43 million) who voted for Johnson because they liked and trusted him, and the second term, $(1 - k_2) V_2$, represents those voters (25 percent of 27.2 million) who voted for Goldwater because they disliked Johnson. Using the same reasoning, the net vote for Goldwater would be given by

$$T_2 = k_2 V_2 - (1 - k_1) V_1$$

Some of the characteristics of this plan are interesting. In our example, the equa-

tions for T_1 and T_2 show Johnson's net vote to be 23.3 million with a popularity percentage of 33 percent and Goldwater's vote to be 7.5 million with a percentage of 11 percent. We see that the popularity percentages do not add to 100 percent. We see too that Goldwater dipped perilously close to 0 percent. It is, in fact, possible for the loser, and even the winner, to receive a negative net vote. If the equations for T_1 and T_2 are subtracted, the vote difference, $T_1 - T_2$, is the same as the difference, $V_1 - V_2$, of our present system of voting, so the proposed system cannot affect the material outcome of a two-man race. In spite of this, the new system would undoubtedly have a helpful moral effect on our presidential campaigns. In the Nixon-McGovern race, it seemed to be important to many people to have Nixon win with a greater (or smaller) popular vote percentage than Johnson in the 1964 election. To a candidate, winning comes first, but the vote percentage (mandate from the people, etc.) is important, too. With the proposed voting system a candidate might win an election by frightening voters away from his opponent, but he could not increase his own popularity, as measured by the net, T . Perhaps this might lead to that much-desired end, a candidate stressing his own strong points rather than his opponent's weaknesses.

The three-man race is more complex. In addition to its moral effect, the proposed plan may even in some cases affect the material outcome of a race. Under our present voting system, it is normally important to campaign positively in a three-man race, since taking votes from one candidate only to watch them go to a third is a poor victory. This is sometimes forgotten in the turmoil of a campaign, however, because no one knows for certain where those votes will go. In fact, if a third, minor candidate has a somewhat inflexible base, such as Wallace perhaps had in 1968, a three-man race takes on some features of a two-man race, and there is no penalty for negative campaigning. Voters frightened away from A by B will vote for B or stay home. The reverse may not be true, and C's voter base may appear inflexible to A, but

not to B. At the other end of the spectrum, a third, minor candidate having a reputation as a "moralist" or as everyone's second choice may profit greatly from the negative campaigning of two major candidates.

The new voting plan removes these uncertainties. If A impresses a voter positively, he is one vote ahead, but if he frightens a voter away from B, then C profits *exactly* as much as A. Both A and C effectively gain half a vote (so A has to work twice as hard with negative campaign tactics). C's voter base is no longer inflexible, except for those voters firmly committed to him in a positive sense. The three-man race, with one candidate having an inflexible base as at present, can no longer become a two-man race in the sense of scare tactics being used with impunity by the two major candidates. Neither can C the moralist gain *unduly* from the blood-letting of two major candidates. He profits, to be sure, and can watch happily as they knife each other. The main point, however, is that with the new plan the major candidates will know precisely what part of a vote is gained and lost. They can be certain that degeneration to scare campaigning will be punished, if only by a drop in their popularity index.

In the 1968 race the vote totals, in millions, were: Nixon, $V_1 = 31.7$; Humphrey, $V_2 = 30.9$; Wallace, $V_3 = 9.4$. Of Nixon's votes, $k_1 V_1$ were for him, and $(1 - k_1)V_1$ were against Humphrey and Wallace. For lack of a better estimate, we take $\frac{1}{2}(1 - k_1)V_1$ against each of the others. Note that this uncertainty applies only to elections using our present system. Under the proposed plan, the voter would have more freedom to express himself, and his motives would be more apparent. If the proposed voting system had been in effect in 1968, the votes for each candidate would have been

$$\begin{aligned} T_1 &= k_1 V_1 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - k_2)V_2 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - k_3)V_3 \\ T_2 &= k_2 V_2 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - k_1)V_1 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - k_3)V_3 \\ T_3 &= k_3 V_3 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - k_1)V_1 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - k_2)V_2. \end{aligned}$$

If we take all the k coefficients as 0.7, we find $T_1 = 16.2$, $T_2 = 15.5$, and $T_3 = -2.8$, and Nixon's popularity index is 23 percent. If all the k coefficients were

slightly higher, at 0.8, Nixon's popularity index would be 30 percent, about the same as Johnson's in his "landslide."

The actual vote difference between Nixon and Humphrey in 1968, $V_1 - V_2$, was 0.8 million, but $T_1 - T_2$ in this example is 0.7. Here we see a small material effect on vote differences. The difference in net votes, $T_1 - T_2$, under the new system can be found by subtracting appropriately in the last group of three equations. For the special case, $k_1 = k_2$, the result is

$$T_1 - T_2 = \frac{1}{2}(1 + k_1)(V_1 - V_2)$$

and since the confidence factor k_1 is less than one, $T_1 - T_2$ will be smaller than $V_1 - V_2$.

If Hubert Humphrey had campaigned more positively in 1968, with the new voting plan in effect, and had raised k_2 to 0.75, while k_1 and k_3 remained the same at 0.7 the net votes under the new system would have been $T_1 = 16.9$, $T_2 = 17.0$, and $T_3 = -2.1$. Then (neglecting the factor of electoral votes) Humphrey might have won that cliffhanger. Keep in mind that this change in net votes did not require Humphrey by some eloquence to win votes committed to Nixon. Those votes never belonged to Nixon. Humphrey's task was only to persuade the voters to vote for himself rather than against Nixon.

In spite of this example, the primary effect of the proposed voting plan is unlikely to be its material influence on the outcome of elections. I see these major benefits of the system:

(1) It gives the voter greater freedom in making his views known, and it gives the victor (and indeed all of us) a truer idea of voter attitudes about his programs.

(2) A candidate who really wants a mandate from the people will have to present his ideas in a positive form, because the way to increase his popularity index is to increase his confidence factor, k , and that cannot be done by belittling his opponent.

Surely any change in our system that eliminates television commercials about little girls being blown up by hydrogen bombs can't be all bad. $\square$

Book Review

Mark Twain: God's Fool

It is rather like being told there is no Santa Claus to read Hamlin Hill's biography of Mark Twain; but we suffer more because now our beliefs are more ingrained and inflexible than they were during childhood. The lovable American humorist, the teller of children's stories, the impish and adventurous Huck Finn whom we cannot help but identify with his creator—all these are suppressed in Hill's book which concentrates on the last ten deeply troubled years of Samuel Clemens' life. Instead we see an embittered old man furiously and unsuccessfully involved in speculation, neglecting those who love him and becoming at least partially responsible for two of their deaths.

by Hamlin Hill
Harper & Row \$10.00

Much of *Mark Twain: God's Fool* is based on the previously unpublished diary of Isabel Lyon, Clemens' personal secretary, and it contradicts Albert Bigelow Paine's carefully edited *Mark Twain: A Biography* published in 1912, ten years after Twain's death. Paine, a member of the Clemens household for several years, and Clara, the only one of Twain's three daughters to outlive him, continued the censorial tradition of Olivia Langdon Clemens, deliberately omitting from Twain's biography the un-

pleasant aspects of his life. And there were several. Olivia's "nervous prostration" which struck in August 1902 and lingered until her death in June 1904 must have been attributable in some way to her husband, because her doctors refused to let him see her during much of her convalescence lest she suffer a relapse. Twain's daughter Susy's death from spinal meningitis at the age of twenty-five led the whole family to such morbid activities as annual celebrations of her birthday and anniversaries of her death. The youngest Clemens daughter, Jean, was severely epileptic, and for several years, Hill contends, her father was repulsed by her illness and frequently sent her away from his house. When Jean

drowned in the bathtub, apparently as a result of an epileptic seizure, Twain felt a sense of relief, and wrote to his only surviving daughter, Clara: "O, Clara, Clara dear, I am so glad she is out of it and safe—safe! I am not melancholy; I shall never be melancholy again, I think."

Only Clara remained. But even she was not without troubles. She had spent these tragic years alternating between rest homes and a singing career, while spending her father's money and showing little gratitude. For motives that are still unclear, Clara determined to get rid of Isabel Lyon and her husband, Ralph Ashcroft, who had served as Clemens' business manager for several years. By accusing them of embezzling money, she appealed to her father's mercenary instincts and thus aroused his indignation. Clemens hired an accountant to audit his books, and discovered that Isabel had indeed spent approximately \$2000 more than was allotted for her own clothes and furnishings. But for a man of Clemens' means, this was not extravagant, and there

is little reason to believe she was willfully dishonest. At any rate, the Ashcrofts were publicly scandalized, and all mention of either of them was obliterated from Paine's biography.

Hill refers to other unappealing aspects of Mark Twain, such as his peculiar enchantment with fifteen-year-old girls and his sudden losses of temper. But the bulk of the book is devoted to Twain's family problems which kept him from the humorous writing which had made him famous and for which the public still longed.

Under the circumstances, one cannot blame Twain for switching to condemnations of the human race and of a God that arbitrarily and unjustly rewards evil and punishes good. He had, after all, always preferred Satan's heroic uncontained energy to God's indifference. It is not surprising that in *The Mysterious Stranger*—one of Twain's last works which was compiled posthumously and has recently been revised—Mark Twain creates his own alter-

ego in the form of Satan. Satan is the Mysterious Stranger who, although he is not utterly malevolent towards mankind, is tragically indifferent to it. The final chapter of this work offers the consolation that life is only a dream anyway. Possibly, as Bernard DeVoto maintains, this is the only satisfactory answer Twain can come up with. Crushed by family disappointments, perhaps he must tell himself that life is just a dream.

We should probably be grateful for this plethora of new information regarding Twain's family skeletons and approaching senility. It does, after all, help explain the sudden dearth of good literature from a writer who before 1900 had produced so much. Hamlin Hill has certainly brought to light some revealing aspects of Mark Twain's character which are, I suppose, necessary to the total appreciation of a great literary figure. And yet I cannot help but wish he hadn't.

Judy Tyrrell

Book Review

The Intellectuals and the Powers

There is a story about an Englishman who, rebuked for his sloppy dress, remarked that the purpose of the clothing is to mark the spot where the body can be found. That is as much as you can say for the word "intellectual." When you see "intellectual" in the title of a book you know without looking inside that you are invited to read about people who have their antenna out for information and ideas, engage in subtle and elaborate reasoning, and communicate with other people. But you won't know until you look further whether there will be any mention of holiness preachers, labor union officials, members of the National Academy of Sciences, or writers of detective stories—the brightest of whom, I venture, keep their eyes and ears well honed, devise arguments and propound conclusions that baffle smart people who haven't been initiated into the cult, and sound off eloquently when assured an appropriate audience. If stand-out operators in these several categories are *per se* intellectuals, then a study of intellectuals in America can scarcely be differentiated from a study of the highly educated, the influential, and the custodians of prestige and authority.

Even a beginner's acquaintance with recent literature makes it clear that most writing about people referred to as intellectuals omits from attention all but a small segment of the population that qualifies as highly educated, highly influential, and highly endowed with ability to command response from others. An extensive exploration of that literature forces a conclusion that there are about as many different sets of tests for being counted intellectual as there are persons writing on the subject.

In *The Intellectuals and the Powers* Professor Shils troubles himself almost not at

and Other Essays

by Edward Shils
University of Chicago \$12.50

all with definition, with consequent trouble for the reader in my opinion. In spite of my effort to maintain close attention, I was uncertain most of the time as to how much of the population was under consideration. Most of the book is concerned with an inclusive group most clearly identified on page 76 as persons "trained for technology, management, research, and public administration." At other times the author's attention is fixed on a much less numerous group vaguely characterized as "persons with an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society . . . who, more than the ordinary run of their fellow men, are inquiring [and feel] a need to externalize this quest in oral and written discourse, in poetic or plastic expression, in historical reminiscence or writing, in ritual performance or acts of worship" (p. 3).

I am willing, as reader, to do a good share of the work necessary to establish communication with an author, but it seems to me that throughout this book Professor Shils was considerably less cooperative than he ought to have been. I concluded that in many of the essays he was discussing a strip of the knowledgeable, articulate, and influential population that did not include the mine-run lawyers, doctors, engineers, professors, journalists, efficiency experts (who unquestionably are trained for technology, management, research, or public administration) but did include important functionaries of the society not likely to be viewed by themselves or anybody else

as especially tuned-in on the sacred or uncommonly preoccupied with the fundamental nature of their universe, who too seldom read a book to be suspected of an urge to write one.

Failure to make clear who is under examination is a fault of the book in my judgment. Shifting from one object of attention to another is not a ground for offense, however, for the essays which make up the book were written at different times for different audiences. There are twenty-three essays in all; nine were first printed in the decade immediately preceding their publication in this volume; one dates from 1938; another appears not to have been previously printed. Professor Shils summarizes his work in an introduction to this collection. Summarizing his summary (pp. xii-xiii): he examines the charge that intellectuals tend to be alienated from their society and finds that this is by no means generally the case; he explores the institutions and the traditions which foster the appearance and development of intellectuals and support intellectual activity in the inclusive fabric of social structure and civil order; and in pursuit of these several interests he looks in upon the gifted, trained, and influential stratum in the United States, Europe (especially Great Britain), and several technologically less advanced nations in Asia and Africa.

I think it is a fair statement that no other American scholar has examined the gifted and influential people of the twentieth century in the depth and with the care that mark these essays. I doubt that any has maintained a higher level of objectivity or has challenged and refuted cherished presuppositions and widely-accepted myths with less slippage into dogmatic assertion. I venture to say that his observations are touched with an unusual sensitivity

throughout, though I see no reason why anyone should trust my judgment on that point. For readers who want to know a great deal about the conditions, the interrelationships, the behaviors that Professor Shils reports and muses upon—and who is seldom or never in doubt as to just who is under scrutiny—this book should be of inestimable value. They are bound to learn.

It is my misfortune not to feel that I have been greatly enriched by an attentive reading of this book, but that failure may be due almost wholly to my own deficiencies. I do not have a talent for ingesting information that is delivered in giant sweeps. Even when Professor Shils is talking about intellectuals narrowly defined, he runs away from me in two directions. The attitudes and behaviors which he reports as prevailing among intellectuals generally seem to me, when I check my own observations, to be restricted mainly to a particular occupation or functional sector of society (e.g., characteristic of "literary men and humane publicists," but not characteristic of architects, economists, and natural scientists who are classed as intellectuals for the particular analysis). Equally puzzling for me is the tendency to exclude from the intellectual category gifted and influential persons whose contributions are fully as creative as the finest product of those who are credited with intellectual roles. The arbitrariness of classification is striking in an essay written especially for this volume (pp. 154-95). During the period of industrial expansion between the Civil War and the First World War, we are told, iron and steel, coal mining, and the railways were industries where free-booting capitalists ruled and in these empires of the robber barons (unlike the situation in the chemical and agricultural industries) there was no use for intellectuals. It was that bad; the industries dominated by free-booting capitalists "had no use for intellectuals." I haven't given any thought to what the giants of the coal fields had use for, but the men who dominated iron, steel, and the railways had a great respect for the tool and dye makers who produced precision instruments that were novel in conception and things of beauty to the men who operated them.

They valued the architect who could make a building highly functional for industrial uses and they paid the bill for architecture that brought beauty into the design of commercial and residential structures. Further, the giant figures of industry and the men who hovered around them designed productive enterprises of grand proportions and intricate relationships that excited the admiration of gaping spectators throughout the world. I cannot purge myself of the conviction that if the diploma-laden college professors brought to Washington by Franklin D. Roosevelt to trim the sharp edges off of industrial empires were intellectuals (which Professor Shils sees them to be, p. 167), then the men who conceived, built, and managed those empires were intellectuals too. This I must conclude if momentous creative achievement and powerful impact on the minds of others are critical tests of intellectual character.

Speaking now not about the work of Professor Shils especially but about the whole body of literature dealing with "intellec-

tuals," I think perceptive inquiry is greatly hindered by failure to differentiate type and quality of contribution from place or status in the social system. There is a concern to give an account of great intellectual feats and the men and women who perform them—the thing of beauty and the person who created it; the imaginative and perceptive piece of writing and the poet, novelist, or scholar who produced it; the creeping and leaping corpus of science and the capacities for minute observation and soaring flights of imagination which find their peaks in men and women we call scientists. This is a prime concern but it gets mixed up with another—the wish to give an account of a particular class of practitioners.

There is good reason to study the influence of song and music on the value structure and moods of the nation, and there may be good reason for studying the sentiments, life styles, and interrelations of men and women who produce and market country music. They are different subjects, however. It would be absurd to argue that country music is the only style of song and tune that contributes to the national character and fraudulent to claim that a study of Nashville and its product is a report on the nation's supply of symphony, string quartet, and mamma's crooning. We encounter that magnitude of absurdity in

some of the writing about intellectuals (not by Edward Shils, be it said). I wouldn't charge fraud but I do charge corruption of common English when the spotlight is turned on gifted people who market their productions of art and thought on a freelance basis and the public is told that these are "the intellectuals" of the nation, not just one branch of a big, big family. Joseph Schumpeter went on a search for that element in a society that has a natural inclination to generate and nourish hostility against the order that sustains them. He tracked the culprits down to their nesting place and he identified them as the nation's intellectuals. "Intellectuals are in fact people who wield the power of the spoken and the written word, and one of the touches that distinguish them from others who do the same is the absence of direct responsibility for public affairs," the lack of which responsibility accounts for another distinguishing touch, viz. "the absence of that first-hand knowledge of [public affairs] which only actual experience can give" (*Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, p. 147). Schumpeter may well have nosed out the crowd who stir up the trouble; I think he drops a pile of rubbish to clutter thinking on other occasions when he says that front-runners in the development and diffusion of thought are removed from the category of intellectuals if they share suf-

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ficiently in running the country to know what is going on.

Boundary lines seem to impose few hindrances to inquiry when intellectual output is under scrutiny. Historians of science invest little energy in argument about where magic leaves off and science begins. Literary criticism flourishes even though critics disagree as to whether particular pieces ought to be treated as literary productions or interpretative journalism. Trouble sets in when attention is fixed on free-lance marketers of literary output, artists who receive no salary checks, denizens of Tin Pan Alley, and others equally uninhibited by intimate knowledge of what Schumpeter called "practical affairs." Trouble starts, it seems clear to me, because writing about

these "irresponsibles" (Schumpeter again) is governed by a wish to credit the class with contributions a few notches higher on the quality scale than the contributions coming out of the people more intricately involved in the ongoing life of the nation.

By all means let us get on with probing study of these important and imperfectly understood people. Let us find out whether novelists who bear their fruit in the grime of New York City or put an ocean between themselves and the miseries of their countrymen write better novels than storytellers who hole up in Mississippi or draw a university paycheck for meeting classes three days a week. Let us find out how much truth there is in the assertion that gifted men and women who are unham-

pered by entanglement in practical affairs "elicit, guide, and form the expressive dispositions within a society" (Shils, p. 5). And while we are finding out these things let us be painfully careful not to overlook Schumpeter's charge that talent plus immunity from responsibility plus innocence of knowledge drawn from firsthand experience breeds an irresistible impulse to shake the body politic until its teeth rattle. The prospect for doing all this will be distinctly brightened if we purge our writing of labored argument designed to prove that most of the people who do intellectual work ought not to be thought of as intellectuals. This is the way I see it.

Charles S. Hyneman



Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Welfare

Among the many television delights served up by last year's Democratic National Convention was the appearance of a speaker for the National Welfare Rights Organization. This individual was one of a long line of advocates of various minority planks which the Platform Committee, in its wisdom, had not seen fit to adopt as part of the 1972 statement of the Democratic alternative. Her particular speech was distinguished, however, by the unusually high degree of anger and self-righteous fervor with which it was delivered (a none-too-easy distinction, considering the competition she had in this area). In part, I suppose, she was irritated by the time-slot granted her—most of the minority reports were heard around 3 A.M. Then, too, the NWRO resented, as did a number of groups at the convention, what it perceived as the expedient scuttling of its position by prospective candidate McGovern now that the nomination seemed within his grasp. But the brunt of the speaker's anger was directed at the obtuse failure of the convention and the American people to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Organization's demands. A welfare family of four, she contended, should receive something in excess of \$6,000 a year from the federal government. But this was not something the government should do out of charity, or even for vague reasons of "social policy." Rather, she said, the government was *required* to do so; the recipients *deserved* such payments; and indeed, the recipients were *entitled* to such payments as a matter of fundamental right. In short, the speech was not the kind of plea for "sensitivity" or "appeal to the conscience" that one has come to expect each time social legislation

is advanced. It was instead a demand that the government cease to deny a basic right to a certain level of welfare payments.

Probably the only people who witnessed this speech in its entirety were insomniacs and those individuals who, like myself, are so fascinated by national political conventions that they are unable to turn them off no matter how late the hour or boring the subject matter. I suspect, however, that Senator McGovern and the other men directing the course of the convention were rather glad to have only a small segment of the electorate listening to the angry young lady from NWRO. While welfare in some form has acquired a certain legitimacy in the body politic, most Americans do not view it as a "right" in the traditional sense of that term. And those same Americans would probably have been surprised to hear such an idea advanced in the forum of a national convention of the current majority party. One wonders how they would react on learning that the idea of "welfare as a right" has already been endorsed and decreed the law of the land by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Court achieved this result in *Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York v. Kelly, et. al.* (390 U.S. 254), a full two years before the Democratic Convention of 1972. Commissioner Goldberg's antagonists in this action were a group of welfare recipients in New York who were about to be stricken from the rolls after investigation by the welfare board had determined them to be ineligible for benefits. The board allowed such individuals to request a "fair hearing" after termination of benefits, with provision for judicial review if benefits were not rein-

stated, and a promise to pay all erroneously withheld funds should the individual be determined eligible after all. "Kelly, et al." protested that this was insufficient. Welfare, they contended, was a basic property right. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, states cannot deprive one of property without "due process of law." Since welfare was so important a right, due process of law in this case had to mean no removal from the welfare rolls until *after* a full evidentiary hearing, complete with counsel and adversary procedures, had been conducted, and all avenues of appeal had been exhausted. Q.E.D.

The Court, in essence, agreed. Welfare benefits, it said, "are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not a 'right.'" The Court then goes on to argue that where the termination of welfare is at issue, "due process" requires more than administrative determination of ineligibility. It required instead, as the petitioners alleged, a "pre-termination evidentiary hearing," including right to counsel and adversary procedures. Moreover, the Court said, "termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility" would "adversely affect [the recipient's] ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy." Accordingly, the state must continue to pay benefits until the controversy is resolved. Finally, the Court argued that this was really in the best interest of the state, since welfare represented part of the "Nation's basic commitment . . . to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders," and could also "bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community." Moreover, the Court blandly asserted, "welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity."

Numerous things can be said about this decision. Its "sociological" statement of the "benefits of welfare" reflects, at the very least, a certain insularity from the practical experiences of the United States in this area. It is difficult, indeed, to see how welfare has fostered "dignity" or enabled the

poor to "participate meaningfully in the life of the community." It is virtually impossible to find evidence that welfare has been an effective guard against "societal malaise." What evidence there is seems distinctly to the contrary.

In addition, the decision seems likely to impose an immense burden on the state. Justice Black, the lone dissenter from the majority, described the probable results in this area very well. The ultimate implications of the Court's decision, he argued, would require the payment of benefits to any recipient whose eligibility was challenged until he had the opportunity, no doubt with the aid of a court-appointed and publicly-paid lawyer, to present his case to the Supreme Court. Of course, this kind of review is a several year process, and no one supposes that, should the government win, it would have any realistic hope of recovering the money it has paid to the ineligible recipient while that process was going on. And since the government is not overly strict about letting people on the welfare rolls in the first place, it is quite likely that anyone the government decides is ineligible really is unqualified for benefits. But this means nothing to the Court; the hardship to those few who might ultimately be reinstated must, it seems, always outweigh such considerations. Conversely, Black points out, the government may respond to the Court's decision in *Goldberg* by becoming very strict about letting people on the welfare rolls in the first place. This would not only involve considerable additional funds for exhaustive investigations of eligibility, but would also (a) lead to the ultimate exclusion of some who are qualified for benefits and (b) force *anyone* who is qualified for benefits to go without until his investigation is complete. In Black's words, "While the Court will perhaps have insured that no needy person will be taken off the rolls without a full 'due process' proceeding, it will also have insured that many will never get on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility."

And then there is the constitutional criticism. It is not at all clear that the Constitution requires a "pre-termination evidentiary hearing" before the government can terminate benefits which the government itself has decided to confer. While the words "due process" prohibit capricious governmental action in depriving people of life, liberty, or property, it is well established that administrative procedures satisfy the requirements of due process in many contexts. Government employees are fired by administrative decision; yet no one contends that the due process clause requires the government to continue paying such employees until the validity of their discharge has been established at a trial. Similarly, taxpayers are constantly denied exemptions by administrative decisions of the IRS; but again, no one urges that the Fourteenth Amendment dictates giving the taxpayer the benefits of the claimed exemption until a judicial proceeding confirms or denies the validity of the IRS choice. Yet both the employee and the taxpayer have clearly been deprived of property in a purely administrative proceeding, without a "pre-termination evidentiary hearing." The only distinction one can draw between them and the welfare recipient is that the "property" of the latter may be a good deal more immediately important to him. The Court indeed emphasizes this; but even if true, it is a distinction not mentioned, much less sanctioned, by the Constitution. It is merely a distinction which appeals to the particular sensitivities of the Court; and the Court, as so often in recent history, is not adverse to using the Constitution to actuate those sensitivities. As Black put it, "This decision is thus only another variant of the view often expressed by some members of this Court that the Due Process Clause forbids any conduct that a majority of the Court believes 'unfair,' 'indecent,' or 'shocking to their consciences.' . . . Neither these words nor any like them appear anywhere in the Due Process Clause."

These criticisms of *Goldberg v. Kelly* are both substantial and, to me, persuasive.

But there is, I think, an even more serious objection. It is one thing for the government to attempt to supply welfare assistance to those it determines to be needy. It is quite another to say (again quoting the dissent of Justice Black) "that the government's promise of charity to an individual is property belonging to that individual when the government denies that the individual is honestly entitled to receive such a payment." And it is still another matter to elevate the receipt of such payments to the status of a personal "right" guaranteed one by the Constitution of the United States.

This, of course, is precisely the view of the rather angry and self-righteous National Welfare Rights Organization. It is the attitude endorsed, albeit in more sober, restrained, and judicial language, by the Supreme Court of the United States. Both groups, I submit, have failed to recognize that "rights," like ideas, are *not* created equal. The fact that a given individual may be qualified for welfare by statute does not give him a "right to welfare" which is worthy of the same praise, the same veneration, the same encouragement, or even the same protection as, say, one's right to a trial by jury in a criminal proceeding, or one's right to worship as he sees fit. For public policy to claim that such rights are equal would be absurd. Indeed, in a certain sense, the very function of public policy is to reflect a society's view of which rights shall be deemed most deserving of society's endorsement.

In a nation with a history of concern for individualism and the virtues of self-reliance and responsibility, it is inconceivable that welfare, if it is to be viewed as a "right" at all, should be considered a particularly revered right. And despite the NWRO and the U.S. Supreme Court, I think most Americans would agree with that statement. Surely, "No termination of welfare without a pre-termination evidentiary hearing" has not yet become the twentieth-century equivalent of "No taxation without representation." □

Book Review

I.Q. in the Meritocracy

Nature, nurture, or not sure? Which is the primary determinant of intelligence: heredity, or environment? If IQ is principally inherited, then much of our compensatory education efforts for lower-class children are wasted, and failure may run in the genes. Richard Herrnstein, a professor of psychology at Harvard, has had the courage to present part of the voluminous evidence indicating the heritability of intelligence and he has endured the contumely of those who espouse egalitarianism and environmentalism. The book, *I.Q. in the Meritocracy*, is a cogently argued elaboration of the defense of "hereditarianism" which Dr. Herrnstein first proposed in the September 1971 *Atlantic Monthly*; it also contains some shocking tales of Herrnstein's vilification by radical

by Richard Herrnstein
Little, Brown & Co. \$7.95

distortionists, abetted by silence or faint defense from liberal opportunists.

Knowing the IQ of a child in second grade, one can predict with a high likelihood of success his IQ twenty years later (little or no change), and his social status as measured by occupational level. The Coleman Report and the studies done recently on Head Start indicate that spending more money than the average on this child's education, or giving him special classes, is likely to make no difference in his future performance. The failure of programs like Head Start generate two different reactions: some say not enough was done, more

money must be spent; others say people are endowed with a wide variety of abilities and disabilities at birth, endowments which are beyond the reach of social engineers. If men are born equal in skills, claim the first group, then they succeed or fail because of what has been done or not done for them and to them. They fail because we fail them and all that is required for their success is that we equalize environments to produce the New (necessarily socialist) Man. "Hogwash!" cry those who believe in individualism: men are infinitely varied and the free society offers the myriad possibilities appropriate for such multifaceted creatures.

Some things can be inherited, like tallness or blondness, and others not, like the preference for Chevrolets over Fords.

Even the heritable things can be affected by environment: hair can be dyed or growth stunted, for example. It is now irrefutable that intelligence (more precisely, IQ) is heritable. Identical twins raised apart end up with IQs unusually alike. Foster children placed when very young in new homes have IQs more like those of their biological parents than those of their foster parents. The environmental handicap of being deaf from birth produces very little difference in the average IQ in comparison with the average for the population at large. This is but a sampling of the evidence showing that IQ is inherited and inheritance overrides environment. Professor Herrnstein goes into this evidence in detail, showing its strengths and occasional shortcomings. His conclusion: for the wide variety of environments of white Americans and Europeans, there is a "convergence of the overwhelming body of data on measured intelligence to a figure in the vicinity of 80 percent or higher for the genetic contribution to scores on standard IQ tests."

As environmental factors are made more nearly equal for all people, genetic differences would play an even greater role than they do now. Since people of similar IQs are more likely to marry each other than those of dissimilar IQs, the effect of homogenizing our environments would be to produce a hereditary elite, if the past and present correlation between IQ and success holds in the future. Those social engineering measures which seek to make environmental factors equal for all may lead to a "meritocracy" with hereditary castes, if such castes do not already exist.

The nature/nurture controversy is made more explosive by the accumulated evi-

dence that blacks average 15 points lower in IQ than whites, which puts 80 percent or so of the white population above the black average IQ. Clearly blacks *have* suffered job discrimination, but just as clearly the white subgroup with an IQ distribution similar to the blacks' have also been relegated to the less attractive and lower wage jobs, not because of racial discrimination but because of their limited capabilities. Unless there are environmental factors which can be identified and remedied—poor diet, for instance—this IQ differential would strongly inhibit black advancement even if racial prejudice were eradicated. Herrnstein handles this facet of the controversy carefully, noting that some of the difference in IQ between blacks and whites is no doubt due to problems specific to the black environment but that the question of a genetic intelligence difference between races has not been answered. Even though intelligence is something that is heritable, like tallness, and even though it is predominantly influenced by inheritance among whites in white environments, it can be stunted by sufficiently bad conditions, just as growth can be.

When T.D. Lysenko and other Lamarckian charlatans ruled the biosciences roost (and ruined the roosters) for several decades in twentieth-century Russia, the study of genetics was banned. The Marxist creed was that environment was all, heredity nothing. The New Socialist Man allegedly could be created by manipulating his environment. This environmentalist dogma when applied to Russian agriculture was a dismal failure; genetics, applied to agriculture in the West, was a distinct success. Still, the powerful Lysenko clique sup-

pressed the views of the hereditarians of its day, aided in this by the totalitarian Russian regime, which had a vested interest in the antiheredity position. In America today, hereditarians like Herrnstein and Berkeley's Dr. Arthur Jensen find their ideas first distorted, then attacked. As Herrnstein shows, there is a pattern: radicals label the ideas and their promulgators "fascist" and "racist" and try to prevent their dissemination; liberals do not defend the right of the hereditarians to be heard, or if they do, it is only after finding something in the hereditary position to quibble about . . . they couldn't be uncritical of something labeled "fascist," could they? (Some of the scholars Herrnstein has talked with admit that he is right, but won't defend his views; maybe they can't take the flack or don't want to admit the failure of egalitarianism.) Radical epithets plus liberal quibbling make the argument that intelligence is heritable seem not only vicious but also ill-founded, when it is neither.

We each are unique. We are diverse. This diversity needs freedom in which to flourish. Artificial barriers to our development should be removed, but some barriers are inborn. Egalitarian policies could prevent success, but cannot eradicate failure. A recognition of diversity of talents can lead to programs tailored to special talents or to lack of them, but "success" may be largely predetermined by heredity, in which case we shall still have to reward excellence and not reward incompetence. Praise or blame may not be as appropriate as we once thought. The fault, dear Brutus, may be largely in our genes.

D.W. Cooper

Book Review

The Fellow Travellers

The natural and proper attitude of conservatives towards fellow travellers is one of contempt. Towards Communists one may feel hostility tempered by the respect accorded a clever and intellectually honest enemy; towards liberals, a sort of symbiotic competitiveness. But fellow travellers are, and have been, apologists for two of the most tyrannical regimes in the history of man. They have rationalized the execution of millions (when they have deigned to notice these deaths at all) as the necessary sacrifice one must make in order to reach Marxist goals, while most egregiously declining to accept either these goals or sacrifices for their own society.

David Caute's book deals with these men, defined as those whose commitment to Communism was made "at a distance," who chose Communism for others, but not for themselves. Such individuals as Bernard Shaw, Lincoln Steffens, André Gide, the Webbs, and Henry Ward have their activities chronicled in minute, almost pedantic fashion: what speeches were made to which groups, which fronts were joined, etc. Perhaps unfortunately, the same treatment is

A Postscript to the Enlightenment

by David Caute
Macmillan \$8.95

given to many lesser figures, such as Corliss Lamont, who appears not to have done anything of interest other than join more Popular Front organizations than any other American of his generation. Caute understandably focuses most of his attention on the period between the two world wars, when the triumph of Bolshevism and the decay of capitalism were seen with an exaggerated clarity, and the Soviet Union had more admirers than it was ever to have after the Second World War. He deals at length with the whole sorry business of the denials, made by prominent western intellectuals, of the existence in the Soviet Union of purges, concentration camps, or famines, and the concurrent defense of show trials and the execution of Kulaks, Old Bolsheviks, artists, and sundry others. He takes care to demonstrate that accurate information on what was actually going on

inside the Soviet Union was available, and thus that ignorance or a willingness to give the Workers' State the benefit of all reasonable doubts could not be addressed in favor of the fellow travellers.

At this point, Caute raises the logical question of how humane, and in some cases, intelligent men could praise so uncritically a clearly despotic regime. He responds by considering two points which, taken together, explain both the acceptance of Soviet atrocities and the failure of the fellow travellers to adopt a revolutionary stance vis-à-vis their own countries. First, there was the idea that what was happening in the Soviet Union (and later in China) was justified as a rational attempt to reach rational goals. Collectivization, for instance, was instituted in order to eliminate the idiocy of rural life and was *imposed*, where necessary, because of the intransigent stupidity of the peasantry. De-Kulakization was simply the elimination of irrational and unjust inequality. Caute makes the general claim that the fellow travellers were heirs to the Enlightenment vision of Reason ruling society, educating

and remolding men, thereby liberating them from the shackles of ignorance and privilege. In the centralized economic administration of the Soviet Union, and in the totalitarian efforts to remake society, the fellow travellers saw an attempt to bring this dream into being, and they could not fail to support it. There was also a decided elitism in the fellow travellers who saw and admired Stalin the Planner, administering his country on a perfectly rational basis, without interference from the bourgeoisie or the working class.

But there was, of course, another element within these men which caused them to refrain from adopting Communist societies for themselves. Caute makes reference to the by-now trite idea that a primitive people need authoritarian control in order to develop and progress and, in fact, do not mind being deprived of freedoms which they never enjoyed. Modern western states, on the other hand, have achieved liberal democratic rights which are not to be surrendered in the interest of the GNP or social justice. Hence, he argues, there was no blatant hypocrisy in the fellow travellers' position.

There are clearly many ways in which

to criticize the Enlightenment view of society or the principle of ethical relativism. I wish only to show that these two concepts do not explain, as Caute states, the phenomenon of fellow travelling. First, it should be clear that fellow travellers were not the only or most important disciples of the Enlightenment: its ideas are inextricably implanted in modern western society. The revulsion against the anti-Enlightenment regime of Nazi Germany makes this obvious. Thus while the presence of an Enlightenment ethos shows why fellow travellers of the Left existed while "fellow travellers" of the Right did not, it does not explain why a small group of men went much further than the rest of society in extolling Soviet Russia. Second, the fellow travellers were often most noticeable in defense of the persecution of intellectuals or members of the bourgeoisie, as Caute documents. These people were not backward or uneducated. They knew what liberty was and sorely felt its absence. The fellow travellers who acquiesced in their destruction could not believe it was a painless operation. They could believe that it was necessary to crush certain classes to bring about a new order, but then logically

they would have to insist on their own destruction, which they conspicuously did not do. Further, Caute ignores the question of whether any people, no matter how debased or savage, enjoys having a few score millions of its population exterminated.

I would argue instead that a certain masochism is necessary to fellow travelling. Running through the statements of Gide, Steffens, and other American intellectuals quoted in this book, there is a feeling of guilt at possessing so much wealth and so many privileges, and a satisfaction (particularly in Steffens) in the thought of men like themselves being done away with as a class. Had they not wished to torment themselves, these men could have decisively adopted Communism. This would have expiated their bourgeois sins, since their prerogatives would then be serving the movement. But they uniformly refused to accept Party discipline, and instead chose to wallow in their guilt. Caute does not seem to realize this, and hence, though he has written a thorough enough history, his book lacks the venom his subject demands.

Stephen Rosen



"Mean Streets" and "The Long Good-bye"

You can get up, but you cannot get out. That is the terrible law imposed upon the characters who people Martin Scorsese's masterpiece, *Mean Streets*. Four young men run around and around in the maze of Little Italy's small streets on Manhattan's lower East Side. They are all struggling to make good in a world they never made and over which they basically have no control. They cannot function at all outside it.

At one point Harvey Keitel, playing Georgie, a desperately conflicted small-time hood, tries to drive his girl friend, Teresa, and another friend, the lunatic Johnny Boy, into Brooklyn. "What are you doing?" they say. "We don't know Brooklyn." And a terrible tragedy overcomes them in that borough.

Georgie goes to church every week, to Confession, where the priest tells him to say ten Hail Marys and ten Our Fathers. But he does not believe in it. "You do your penance on the streets," he says. And he is always doing his penance. He truckles to a self-important petty Mafioso uncle who may reward him with a restaurant. He tries to ward off the obvious doom of his deranged friend, Johnny Boy, played magnificently by Robert De Niro. He makes an

effort to be like Saint Francis among the hired killers.

He lives by a code which he never questions, and whose utter artificiality and irrelevance he does not even glimpse. His world is Little Italy and its laws, the hypocritical moral code of eighteenth-century Sicily, are unbreakable. He cannot disobey them even when they make him act cruelly towards his lover, Teresa, calling her dirty names because she sleeps with him, at the same time desperately needing her and hating himself for keeping her in a closet, meeting her for rendezvous at cheap hotels. The code tears him apart, and he does not understand why.

The other characters are similarly trapped. Teresa herself must summon all of her strength even to consider moving out of her parents' miserable apartment into an apartment uptown, by herself. She, unlike Charlie, knows that she has to get out to live, and she hates herself and the world around her for making her feel guilty about wanting to leave but also forcing her to do it. As played by Amy Robinson, Teresa is a character of almost unparalleled humanity: As she and Charlie leave the hotel, she says to a black maid, "You can make up the room now." When the maid replies, "I

only got two hands," Teresa snaps, "Then use them." She is a real person and she takes out her frustration on others, as real people do. Georgie, still thinking he is Francis of Assisi, apologizes to the maid.

Mike wants to be a loan shark. He has some essential sense of humor and humility, but the code will not allow it. He buys what he thinks is a load of stolen German telephoto lenses which turn out to be Japanese lens adapters, virtually valueless. He lends money to Johnny Boy, who not only does not pay it back, but taunts Mike for not being man enough to get it from him. Mike cannot let Johnny Boy get away with it without fatally damaging his standing as a tough guy, so he invokes a tragic ending for everyone.

But of all the characters living out a fantasy of collective neurosis, Johnny Boy is the most deranged and split. He alone leaves the neighborhood for forays into Greenwich Village to pick up girls. He, who has supposedly been acting bizarrely since he was hit with a nightstick, cannot even begin to control the rage he feels at being entrapped in a world of rigid and unrealistic laws of behavior.

He will not act out the part everyone else chooses of the up and coming junior Capo. When everyone else is acting calm and passing out the whiskey, Johnny Boy starts a fight. He climbs to the roof of his building and shoots a pistol at random targets. He throws bombs into mailboxes just for the hell of it. And what is most self-destructive of all, he mocks everyone who tries to help him, finally mocking himself into a violent death. He is, throughout the movie, a human bomb, ready to explode at any moment from the force of his unresolved conflicts.

There are other good roles in the movie. It is a movie which brings alive the whole human geography of an area and the people who live in it. But it is much more than

that. It is an allegory of the life that almost everyone suffers through—blocked and hemmed in by artificial barriers and laws which keep us from seeing the larger world and opportunities around us. It is a story of how a world which people choose to protect them eventually suffocates them, even though they may remain alive. *Mean Streets* is a story of an entire neurotic demimonde, exactly corresponding to the demimonde that most of us carry around with us in our heads.

It is a wonderful affirmation of the power of movies to show us something piercingly insightful about our world in a vehicle which is hypnotically fascinating from the very first moment.

It is by no means perfect—it has irrelevant background music, a laughably false bartender who quotes Blake, too many jokes about eating "Chinks" (Chinese food)—but it is a masterpiece.

Scorsese, who previously gave to the world the hilariously simple-minded and pretentious *Boxcar Bertha*, has more than done his own penance. His direction reinforces the feeling of claustrophobia which is written into the script and acted with brilliance.

Arriving almost at the same time is Robert Altman's *The Long Good-bye*. Based loosely on a Raymond Chandler story, the movie is an almost uniquely funny comedy—it starts out being funny and never stops being funny for one moment. It is the first absurdist detective story, an innovation which, it suddenly appears, was long overdue.

The Raymond Chandler kind of detective story hovered for so long and so precariously on the brink of being absurd in itself that the slight push over the edge which Altman has given it does not work against it at all.

The usually execrable, but here, wonderful Elliott Gould plays Philip Marlowe, a private detective from the 1940s who has suddenly awakened to find himself living in the Los Angeles of the 1970s with girls as neighbors who sunbathe nude, a cat who will only eat one brand of food, and killers and victims who are imitations of themselves.

Great American Series

I really regret getting involved in this thing.

Donald Segretti, LL.B.

The plot is the same one Chandler used in every one of his stories, about double-crosses and murders among rich people and mobsters. But Altman's characters are larger than life. The rich couple being harassed by the gangster live in a mansion in Malibu which seems to go on forever. Scenes in the house of the rich are shot through gauze, to emphasize the ridiculously unreal nature of the life these people live.

Chandler's usual smooth-talking, always-calm gangster is a grotesquely modish punk who smashes his girlfriend across her face with a Coke bottle to show Marlowe that he does that to people he loves, and he does not even like Marlowe. When he decides he has wronged his girlfriend, he wants to give her "a totally open, totally natural apology." So he goes to her hospital room, takes off his clothes, and apologizes to her while standing naked.

The laconic Marlowe has become utterly passive. His only action, until the very last frames, comes as quips and wisecracks. When the police take him in, a cop says

to him, "Marlowe, that sounds like a fag name. You a fag, Marlowe?" The best Marlowe can do is say, "Yeah. You a fag?"

Marlowe is just a by-stander while the world goes on around him. The swirl of voices and sounds near him never stops, even while he is sleeping. Events overtake him and he cannot do anything to change their mocking his powerlessness. When he spots someone he wants to talk to driving along Wilshire Boulevard, he runs after her car. But he cannot catch up to her and he is hit by a car while trying. As he lies bleeding on the pavement, the woman zooms off showing her personalized license plate—"LUV YOU."

But Marlowe's world is an amusing place. The gate attendant for the lush Malibu compound does an imitation of a different movie star with each passer-by, first Jimmy Stewart, then Cary Grant, then Walter Brennan. Marlowe has learned what Chandler's fans knew all along—his world is a richly amusing place and he might as well sit back and watch it in a philosophical mood, since it is wholly out of his control.

The people in Marlowe's world are not the wrenchingly life-like tormented souls of *Mean Streets*. But they are bursting with vitality and interest even at their slowest pace. They speak of how exaggerated and caricatured our lives have become without speaking rancorously. *The Long Good-bye* is a tale of a society which has inflated itself to a size proportionate only to satire.

The pity of all of this is that at most these two movies will be seen by a few million people. The real action is on television, where creatures from another planet write, direct, and star in shows which get at least ten million viewers just for being on. The viewers are at home and the shows are at the theaters. Perhaps someday something can be arranged. □

Book Review

"A Last-Ditch Stand"

Recent publication of Jack Kerouac's long-awaited *Visions of Cody*, as well as Ann Charters's biography, have brought on a renewed interest in the whole Beat phenomenon, and as periodically happens, all the so-called hippies on campus are again rushing out to the bookstores to read, many of them for the first time, *On The Road*.

And so the Kerouac legacy continues to grow. His stature as a counterculture guru is well established and that, as Kerouac himself lamented, seems to be his fate: to be co-opted by a generation of "leftists" that never really understood him, and with whom he felt little kinship. As a result, he has come to represent for many a kind of Cold War flower child who predicted and blessed everything that was to happen to youth pop-cult as the years of jazz and street kicks slid into those of acid and activism.

But, as time goes by and much of the fog obscuring the life and meaning of Kerouac begins to lift, those who see the author of

Visions of Cody
by Jack Kerouac
McGraw-Hill \$8.95

Kerouac
by Ann Charters
Straight Arrow \$7.95

The Subterraneans, *Desolation Angels*, and *Big Sur* as a bearded peacenik, extolling the virtues of mindlessness between drugs on a reefer, are likely to be surprised.

But first, the legends. By one popular notion, Kerouac was trying through the great "rucksack revolution" to shake the fabric of the American political system to the ground. By another, he was the most "far out" radical the American literary scene has ever known. By another—popularized by Allen Ginsberg and Gore Vidal, quite naturally—he was a drooling gay liber. By another he was a junkie.

All of these are fictions—but the truth about Kerouac, I fear, would startle his

unconscious subverters more than the yarns they themselves cooked up. Kerouac was, politically and—I argue this fully knowledgeable of the man's obvious excesses—temperamentally, a conservative. He said as much himself ("I'm not a Beatnik, I'm a Catholic"), but beyond his stated convictions is substantial evidence.

When *Esquire's* John McLintock sought him out in his Florida refuge shortly before his death, Jack ushered the magazine writer into a room strewn with Falstaff bottles and stacks of *National Review* magazines. "If Kerouac had a hero," the interviewer wrote, "it was William F. Buckley, Jr."

At the time, he had received a plea from a left-wing organization that he not pay his taxes because they were going to finance the Vietnam war. "It makes me sick," Jack wrote to John Coyne at *National Review*—who was then in the employ of Spiro Agnew—"It sounds like a complaint from Al Capone."

While his young disciples were toasting him with their new-found marijuana—it was “tea” to the hipsters back in the forties—Kerouac had already renounced drugs because, in his opinion, “they block out reality.” His view of acid—LSD, the big kick of the sixties—was even dimmer. “I took it once,” he confessed, “I didn’t like it.” He later concluded, in all seriousness, that its introduction into the United States was the doing of the communists to weaken the American social fiber.

It was shortly before his death in 1969 that Kerouac had put together a piece for syndication in the newspapers. It was called “After Me, The Deluge,” and in it he attempted for the last time to define his own position with regard to the New Left. “I’m pro-American and the radical political involvements seem to tend elsewhere. The country gave my Canadian family a good break, more or less, and we see no reason to demean said country,” he wrote.

“It’s about the Communist conspiracy,” he told one writer regarding the article. And, as McLintlock wrote, Kerouac “disowned the American counterculture in one sweeping rollcall.”

Not only was he saying these disturbing things, but his personal relationships with other head honchos and gurus of the counterculture—many of them old friends like Ginsberg—began to deteriorate as they went deeper and deeper into hippiedom. Once, at a party at Ken Kesey’s in New York, the poet Ginsberg satirically draped an American flag over Jack’s shoulders. “So I took it,” Kerouac explained, “and I folded it up the way you’re supposed to, and I put it on the back of the sofa . . . the flag is not a rag.”

Kerouac eventually split completely with the flipped-out Ginsberg—although Ginsberg showed up for Jack’s funeral in the fall of 1969 and managed to become a pall-bearer and so get his picture in the newspapers—who had since become the leader of the flower power kids at the Gathering of The Tribes and had “Om-ed” his way around the Pentagon with Robert Lowell and Norman Mailer.

He saw, perhaps sadly, his old pal Neal Cassady, “the mad Ahab of the wheel,” ride off into the day-glo sunset with Ken Kesey and the Merry Pranksters, with whom Neal had become so involved that the famous Kerouac-Cassady friendship manifested itself in little more than a few muttered pleasantries when they met up again at the Hell’s Angels party in 1968. Later, in Florida, Kerouac was to say, “I don’t like Kesey. He ruined Neal.”

It no doubt troubled Kerouac in those post-Beat days when all his old pals were sliding so easily from beatnik-to-hippie. John Coyne, with whom Kerouac was corresponding just before his death, says that Jack could not—and did not want—to make the obligatory transition. It was alien to him, Coyne has written, “the listless love and mindless good vibes” that the hippies were championing, and he wanted no part of it.

And so, as the Beat mantle was being hijacked by a new and—to Kerouac—disgusting generation of “leftists” who talked a great deal about, but had little knowledge or appreciation of, America, the deep-felt love of country that Kerouac wove so won-

derfully into his books could only grow. In a time when his America was being so ruthlessly and ignorantly reviled, Jack felt prompted—as someone who knew America intimately—to defend it.

This quite naturally disturbed a great many forward-looking and pious persons. William Burroughs, who had known of Jack’s sentiments for some time, sniffishly dismissed them as the result of “peasant” heritage. *Newsweek* went so far as to question Kerouac’s sanity. John Deck, in the *New York Times Review of Books* wrote that “he was a battered man when he shocked followers with his pronouncements.” One reviewer of the Charter’s biography wrote that Charter “gave short shrift to Kerouac’s late-blooming conservatism, as it should be.” Many spoke knowingly of Kerouac’s “alcoholism.”

But still there was an uneasiness about dismissing in so cavalier a manner such an otherwise “normal” man’s defiant rejection of the party line. So when Bruce Cook, who was then preparing his book, *The Beat Generation*, interviewed Kerouac in 1968, Cook, on behalf of a number of troubled souls, faced him with these accusations of conservatism—the equivalent to them of heresy or cannibalism.

“Listen,” Kerouac told him, “My politics haven’t changed. I’m solidly behind Bill Buckley if you want to know. Nothing in

my books can be seen as basically in disagreement with that. Everybody just assumed that I thought the way they wanted me to think.”

“What bothered me a lot, though,” Kerouac continued, “was the way a certain cadre of leftists among the so-called beats took over my mantle and twisted my own thoughts to support their purpose.”

Cook pressed the point in the interview, and Kerouac objected, “Look, I don’t know if you thought much about this at all, or maybe you already made up your mind about me before you came here. But I want to make this clear. I mean here I am, a guy who was a railroad brakeman, and a cowboy and a football player—just a lot of things ordinary guys do. And I wasn’t trying to create any new consciousness or anything. We didn’t have a whole lot of heavy abstract thoughts. I mean, we were just a bunch of guys out trying to get laid.”

When the book finally came out it seemed that to a degree at least Cook had gotten the point: “There is something a little easy perhaps in associating the beat protest with the left activism as so many have done. The beat movement was essentially a last-ditch stand for individualism. That, anyhow, was how Jack saw it, and he was present at the creation.”

Allen Crawford

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Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **American Graffiti:** 1962 hot-rods, the hop, rock 'n roll, four boys, their girls, a time of testing for all: the best nostalgia flick in a long time. For over-thirties, a must; for infants, teenie-boppers, and sub-thirty smartasses—eat your hearts out.

■ **Bang the Drum Slowly:** Friendship between two ballplayers, one goofy and dying, the other a star. Michael Moriarty and Robert De Niro are splendid as Henry and his hopeless pal Bruce. Vincent Gardenia as the manager, and all other supporting cast members, including Tom Ligon as a hippy ballplayer, contribute to a fine cinema experience.

■ **Day for Night:** Truffaut's song to the cinema, an intricate but easy ramble through the ironies of movie-making within the well-made movie. Jean-Pierre Léaud, Jean-Pierre Aumont, Jacqueline Bisset, nice naughty Nice, and Truffaut himself make this satin-smooth.

■ **Heavy Traffic:** Cartoon full-length feature: vulgar, cruel, cheeky, not for

your Bambi and Dumbo crowd. Brilliantly drawn, viciously objectionable.

■ **Jeremy:** Young love and sex. Your average teenage cellist cum basketball player and his beautiful first girl, holding hands and more in a spotlessly clean New York. Neither fantasy nor quite reality, it is warming; inconsequential, yes, but it feels good.

■ **Jesus Christ Superstar:** Nobody loves it but The People. Relevant? Well Big, brassy, arrogant, but it bowled your servant over.

■ **Last Tango in Paris:** Ha-cha, ha-cha, Brando bold; Paris, Paris, as of old; sock 'em, knock 'em tale ill-told; movie-maker's struck his gold. Oh well, it is A Happening and worth seeing at least so that you can join in the dishing when your friends bemoan their five badly-spent bucks.

■ **The New Land:** Conclusion to Jan Troel's two-part epic (first part: 1972's *The Emigrants*). Over five hours, both halves, detailing a Swedish family's remove to America in the 1850s. Incomparably the finest epic treatment of the

great European folk migration to the United States in the nineteenth century. Stunning performances by Max von Sydow, Liv Ullmann, Eddie Axberg, and Minnesota. Stately, languid, superlative beyond words, *The New Land* (along with *The Emigrants*) ranks with the very finest films ever made. A must see.

■ **The Paper Chase:** *Love Story* at Harvard Law School. Hot-shot young first-year student (Timothy Bottoms) seeking success and boodie, matching wits with his contracts prof (John Houseman, who gets all the best lines) and gropes with his prof's daughter (Lindsay Wagner, who is luscious but a cipher). A self-indulgent little film destined to make more money than it's worth. No center, no point, but the classroom scenes are delights.

■ **Siddhartha:** A lesser work by Herman Hesse (1922) comes to the screen in gorgeous maxi-color; the young Buddha (sorta) discovering himself, you should pardon the expression, in long-ago India. Those heavy-lidded dark eyes flashing, those green green glens shining bright, those lessons in Life! □

EDITORIAL

(continued from page 3)

ideals than their recent hollow get-together in Madison, Wisconsin. There, on that Main Street of American Radicalism, it became eminently clear that beneath every peace and freedom button beats the heart of a Shriner. This autumn, just as foliage festivals were being celebrated in all the backwaters of Podunk, the movement held its fall convention, and no intelligent liberal will ever take them seriously again.

The Madison convention is the kind of sham that only native American conventioners could carry out without a blush. On September 22 Brother Karlton Armstrong pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of a University of Wisconsin graduate student and to a spree of bombings throughout southern Wisconsin, all on behalf of world peace, freedom, justice, green grass, etc., before hightailing it across the border back in 1970. For months the impresarios of the movement had been planning to make the trial of this American Gandhi an occasion by holding one of their peace, freedom, and justice conventions, and by September they were not about to cancel it. The ensuing jamboree lasted over two months, and kept the University of Wisconsin in a pother from the beginning of the school year. The fact that Brother Armstrong had admitted to the bombings and to murder did not douse the conventioners' enthusiasm in the least, for when the worthies of the movement talk about peace and freedom, they speak in lapidary phrases of ritual much the way Rotarians invoke their rote incantations to "service." Forsaking their prior claim of Brother Armstrong's innocence, they began urging that it had been his constitutional right and sacred duty to wreak mayhem and

destruction. But while they frolicked with philosophy and paraded against repression in America, Solzhenitsyn and the other victims of the Russian Bill of Rights were making a last stand against the KGB, which now was taking advantage of the spirit of détente to crush Russian dissidence, and no one in Madison betrayed any evidence that he cared.

The celebrities shuffled in and out of Madison for two months, and were it not for the historic tumult in Washington and the Middle East, I have no doubt that half the nation's news media would have taken up residence in Madison this autumn. Jane Fonda officially flitted in and out of town like the busy little beaver of virtue that she is. Brother Kuntzler set up his soap box on street corners, church steps, and wherever a gullible crowd would have him. The Berrigans were in a fever, saving souls and leading processions. Old troopers like Howard Zinn, Richard Falk, and Tom Hayden were in attendance as were eight full-blooded veterans of Vietnam. There were marches, lectures, rallies, theater skits, and other forms of traditional highjinks. It was a memorable spectacle in every way, and if the saintly Brother Armstrong is going to have to cool his heels in the calaboose for twenty-seven years, fie! Nevertheless the movement did have the opportunity to get together, reminisce, smoke a little cannabis, and roar about peace, freedom, and justice.

It was a high-minded assembly in the great American style. While Solzhenitsyn stood in the shadows of secret police and torture chambers, declaring his people's right to freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom to exit an inhospitable country, the well-heeled and widely-celebrated American peace movement issued press releases from its Holiday Inn head-

quarters, grouching about the grievous state of repression in America.

To this moment the movement has yet to direct one imprecation against the Soviet government that compares with its more benign references to America. None of these illustrious American freedom fighters has yet to burn a Russian flag, picket a Russian Embassy, or show the jackbooted bureaucrats the least glimmer of their vaunted audacity. And the reason is very simple. These are not serious defenders of peace, freedom, and justice, but Rotarians, Elks, and American joiners. They are the most egregious species of pecksniff. They let American POWs waste away in North Vietnam and they will allow the Russian Jews and intelligentsia to suffer in the glorious Soviet Republic. But they hoodwink only featherbrains, and one did not have to be in Madison this fall to note their hypocrisy. From far away and without the benefit of television, radio, or the great American publishing houses, the world's greatest living writer has precisely analyzed their contribution to the struggle for freedom in the world.

"There we have the whole hypocrisy of many Western protests. It is perfectly proper to protest if there is no danger to life, if the opponent is likely to back down and if you don't risk being denounced by the left (in fact, it is always better to protest together with the left).

"The same applies to the various forms of 'neutrality' and 'nonalignment' that have become so widespread. They require you always to bow and scrape toward one side, and always to kick the other side (which happens to be the one that feeds you!)" The writer of course is Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a man whose cause is unfathomable to Jane Fonda.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

"The pilgrim spirit has not fled: It walks in noon's broad light;"


from "The Pilgrim Fathers" by John Pierpont

This Christmas, give the spirit of America

Here is one of the richest collections ever assembled, expressing man's love of country. For the first time in 50 years, a masterful editor has gathered together those heroic ballads and poems that celebrate the birth and growth of America, its hard-won freedoms and traditions, and their beginnings in other lands—everything from the *full* version of Yankee Doodle to The Charge of the Light Brigade.

No tongue is richer in rousing poems of patriotism than our own, and the best are in this beautiful book. Longfellow, Emerson, Harte, McMaster, Freneau, Howe, Whittier, Tennyson, Miller, Holmes, Kipling, Benet, Whitman, Shakespeare, Macauley, Byron, Campbell, Browning, Scott, Burns, Housman, and Chesterton . . . all are here. They capture the heart-calls, the dreams, the feelings of our heroes—and give us a new appreciation of our land and culture.

This Christmas, give the gift of their heritage to the young; a memento of patriotism to the old. Give them to yourself, too. Give *"Breathes There The Man,"* the late National Review Editor, Frank S. Meyer's final work. Fine, gold-embossed, buckram binding, 300 pages, \$10.00. Available at your bookstore. Or use the coupon.



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Correspondence



To the Editor:

Lucky me! No sooner had I finished reading Richard Herrnstein's "scientific" speculation on IQs for Psych 101, than I found Peter Rusthoven's article in the October issue of *The Alternative*. I was distressed, but hardly surprised, to find Mr. Rusthoven's support for such racist dribble as Herrnstein's article has been found to be.

Both Herrnstein and Rusthoven fail to deal with one significant factor in their postulation, i.e., intelligence is undefinable *ergo* it cannot be hereditary. Herrnstein mentions the fact and then dismisses it. Rusthoven circumvents the fact by applying a working definition: intelligence is that which is measured by IQ tests. This is, of course, unacceptable. A more reasonable, objective definition of intelligence would be the ability to adapt to circumstances and environments. Someone from any minority background, e.g., blacks or native Americans, would find it impossible to adapt to the white man's middle class tests.

Herrnstein is also guilty of another major sin in the realm of Psychology. He attempts to attribute a cause and effect relationship to the intelligence of minority peoples strictly on the basis of raw test scores. A no-no.

In the future, one would hope that standards for intelligence in this country need not be based on tests so blatantly discriminatory in nature.

Debra S. Littlefire
Graption, Ohio

Rusthoven responds:

Much as I hate to disturb Ms. Littlefire's adventures in Psych 101, I feel she owes both my own and Mr. Herrnstein's article more careful reading.

First, her statement that "intelligence is undefinable *ergo* it cannot be hereditary" is absurd both in its premise and its conclusion. Clearly, intelligence must have some definition—and Ms. Littlefire proposes one herself two sentences later. If what she meant to say was that intelligence is *difficult* to define, she may be correct; but at that point, I fail to see how that difficulty in any way establishes that "ergo" intelligence cannot be hereditary.

Second, my article did not blandly assert that "intelligence is what is measured by IQ tests." The contention was rather that intelligence has no meaning except in a societal and cultural context; that in western civilization, certain mental abilities or kinds of thinking are more highly valued than others; and that these are indeed the things measured by IQ tests. The high correlation between IQ scores and the distribution of rewards in society is itself *prima facie* evidence that in the context of this culture (which is the only meaningful one for a discussion of intelligence in America), intelligence is indeed measured by IQ tests.

Third, Ms. Littlefire fails completely to deal with Herrnstein's data establishing high correlations between IQ scores and heredity.

Fourth, neither Herrnstein nor myself argued that the lower average scores of minority groups established a "cause and effect" relationship between race and intelligence. Rather, we both explicitly disavowed such a statement and pointed out that more evidence was needed. My only additional point in this regard was that there was nothing in the nature of the universe which *precluded* such a cause and effect relationship, however much that possibility might disturb some.

I suspect Ms. Littlefire is really troubled by two things: one, the idea that differential distributions of rewards may reflect intrinsic, rather than conditioned, differences between individuals; and two, by her own

confusion of the idea of intelligence with more complicated notions about the basic worth or dignity of a human being. A discussion of either, however, would require at least a full-length column.

Peter Rusthoven
Cambridge, Massachusetts

To the Editor:

You are putting out one damn fine magazine.

Charles C. Dayspring
Santa Barbara, California

To the Editor:

I want to thank you for the useful work you are doing on behalf of our country. Since I began reading your magazine three months ago my outlook on life has become immeasurably sunnier. Since reading Mr. Tyrrell's enlightened editorials, one ulcer that had afflicted the inside of my nose for several years has completely disappeared. I have also received partial relief from two soft corns, tennis elbow in my left arm, and thin blood. What more could I ask of one publication?

God bless you and your honorable colleagues.

Oscar the Grouch
Mobile, Alabama

To the Editor:

In response to a suggestion David Brudnoy made to me in his October article, I decided to "take some time out from calling homosexuals queers" to reread his assorted works on the subject. I am, alas, unmoved: Queers. Queers queers queers.

Two quick comments, after which I promise to leave Dr. Brudnoy in peace to battle the brutish, ignorant straw man he chose to attack in lieu of my arguments:

1) I did not compare homosexuals to murderers; in response to the argument that homosexuality is "natural" and therefore not immoral, I simply suggested that homosexual tendencies, like the urge to murder, might be perverse even though they recur in nature. Perhaps I should have used the example of cancer instead.

2) I very much resent the inference that my use of a pseudonym instanced a lack of courage. Dr. Brudnoy (in most un-libertarian fashion) apparently tried to squelch publication of my response on the ground that I did not intend to use my own name; I thought it had been explained to his satisfaction that my then-employer, a public official, was not enthusiastic about the publication of controversial articles under my own name. Thus the use of the pen name "John Randolph."

Lest there be any doubt, however, about my desire to take a public stand on this and other vital issues of our time, I am,

Sincerely,
Grover J. Rees, III
New Haven, Connecticut

To the Editor:

Felix Morley's "From Robert A. Taft to Watergate" raised a number of important issues. I would appreciate the opportunity to comment on a few of them.

If there is one thing this country does not need now, it is the use of unprincipled forms of argument by principled men and women attempting to make some political point. Yet Morley twice attempts to link President Nixon with the Nazis. Was Nixon's election in 1972 a political landslide? Yes, says Morley, but Nixon "nevertheless permitted the most unsavory tactics by his entourage in order to secure a Ja vote of Nationalist Socialist proportions." In case we don't get the point, Mr. Morley, a few sentences later, discards subtlety and tells us "That miniature flag in the buttonhole is

closely akin to Hitler's omnipresent swastika." Felix Morley is, I am certain, too intelligent to really believe such nonsense and I thought that *The Alternative*, one of the last bastions of rational discourse, would be too sensible to print it. Shame, Mr. Morley, shame.

Not content with draping the swastika flag over the slumped shoulders of the President (who, it would seem, has enough *real* troubles and real faults to make his enemies give up trying to pin the Nazi label on him), Morley offers a confused and confusing critique of American conservatism.

He begins by invoking Taft's ghost. Taft, we are told, "doubted the applicability of conservative thought to American politics because of the essentially revolutionary principles of our Constitution." I can only say that if this is what Bob Taft thought about the Constitution, then Bob Taft was wrong. Unless we are to twist words totally out of shape to meet our preconceptions, the word "revolutionary" simply cannot be applied to any part of the Constitution of the United States.

Having in one sentence placed Taft squarely on the side of those who are convinced that there cannot be a genuine American conservatism, Morley then states that "conservative thinking . . . has many fine attributes"—and, as an example, offers the phrase "noblesse oblige" which, he adds, is still "meaningful for the remnants of European aristocracy." Since Morley offers no other example of what he considers conservative thought's "attributes," we are left with the impression that only in Europe (since "less chivalrous characteristics" tend to "dominate" in the United States) can true conservative values be found, and then only among a few aristocrats. At this point I began to believe Morley was writing a parody of Russell Kirk.

Now what about those "less chivalrous characteristics"? According to Morley, they can be found among not only "the Upper Crust" but among "immigrant construction" workers. Both have a "craven fear of change" and both have "a faith in restrictive authority" to "maintain the status quo." Morley then writes one of his more confusing sentences, which I quote here in full:

"Where there is no firmly established church, keeping parishioners in the station to which God is said to have called them, the less mystical substitute of 'law and order' must be invoked."

A slight historical problem arises in connection with Morley's unique analysis. There has not been an established church in this country for almost two hundred years. Is Morley telling us that, between the final disestablishment and the recent invocation of "law and order," the unnamed ruling class was desperately searching for some kind of semi-mystical device to keep the common man in his place? . . .

But Morley is barely warmed up. For one who compares a president to a Nazi for wearing an American flag in his lapel, it is but an easy step to say that the conservative is "curiously akin" to the communist.

Thus, we have Morley's argument against American conservatives: If conservatism has any merits as a philosophy, it can be found only in Europe among the aristocracy. Some say there is an American conservative philosophy, but Morley doubts this. If there is, however, you can be sure it is confined to the Upper Crust, immigrant (you know how *they* are) construction workers and those who mistrust democratic procedures. The man most conservatives voted for in the presidential election of 1972 is a crypto-Nazi. Conservatives are in important ways like Communists . . .

But why go on? Morley has had too distinguished a career to be judged by this inexplicable folly. I do wonder, however, precisely what the editor had in mind when he decided to publish the piece. God

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★
George
Washington
Plunkitt
★

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at avant-garde bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled What's in It for Me? Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

We are forever hearing what's wrong with America. Why can't we hear what's right with America? Rightwingers lament that things are getting worse. I for one believe that things are getting better. After years of chaos from the free market, America is finally accepting rational planning of the economy.

Nonetheless reactionaries still grumble about the benefits of a planned economy like the shortage of beef brought about by wage and price controls. What these ignorants do not realize is that the shortage is all part of a rational plan! Americans eat entirely too much beef. It is causing heart and gastronomic catastrophes that will eventually kill them. Then too they complain about the lack of paper brought on by wage and price controls, strikes, and environmental safeguards. But the fact is that this supposed shortage has actually been carefully planned by experts. Americans read too much junk. It is bad for their eyes and worse for their minds. They even say that we are suffering a fuel shortage brought on by price ceilings on fuel oils. This is another example of Americans' pathological obsession with the negative. Think of the positive side. The air will be

cleaner than it has been during any period since the Ice Age. And the highways. The highways will be clear and clean again. There is nothing I like better than to walk along a really clear and clean highway. As we sit quietly in our homes we will be able to meditate undisturbed by the sounds of passing automobiles. We might even get back to the cheery pastime of reading by candlelight if we can find an old newspaper to read, and if the *New York Times* is unavailable we will always be able to get plenty of government printed materials like commission reports from the Department of Labor, many of which are very sprightly written, providing ample heat for the standard family of four when ignited. How can we convince Americans of the bright side of our new economic miracle?

John Galbraith, Ph.D.
Economist and Sportsman

Dear Dr. Galbraith:

This is a matter of education. Many foreign nations have thrived on planned economies featuring wage and price controls, rationing, and the works. Get these enlightened nations to send their citizens to the United States to proselytize actively for the planned economy. Russians would fit the bill nicely, except for the fact that

the citizens of that great union of free and progressive republics fall prey to an odd mental disorder when they are away from home, and refuse to return. So I think your best bet is Zaire. The citizens of Zaire are flourishing under a planned economy. In fact the fuel shortage is almost unheard of there as donkeys require very little high octane gasoline, or "magic water" as they say over there.

—GWP

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

As you might have heard by now, it has been alleged that I, the President, knew beforehand of the surreptitious entry into the Democratic Headquarters and the offices of that splendid public servant, Mr. Larry O'Brien. Oh boy, what a dastardly deed that was! It is further alleged that I knew of the attempts made by certain, now inoperative, White House aides to cover up the aforementioned low deed. I have had surprising difficulty convincing the public that I, like Mr. Bebe Rebozo, am a totally honest man. Somehow I must recover from this momentary setback with my credibility and my charisma intact.

Cordially,
Richard M. Nixon, President

Dear Mr. President:

Cheer up! You have a touch of the mulligrubs, the migraines, and the spleen. Watch more television. Eat health foods. You might even try nude sunbathing. President Johnson did it, and he was none the worse for the experience.

Frankly I do not understand how it is that people have such difficulty believing that you, the President, were ignorant of the Watergate break-in and of the cover up, when it is obvious that you are not even certain who is on your staff, what they are telling the press, or—as you recently made clear—where your historical records, your memos and your tapes, are hidden. If you cannot even account for tapes of your own conversations, why should we expect you to account for tapes of other peoples' conversations?

—GWP

knows American conservatism needs a no-holds-barred, knock-down, drag-out critique, but it must be one that shows some sign of its author having read some recent conservative literature and having some understanding of how contemporary American conservatives see themselves. . . .

William F. Gavin
Arlington, Virginia

Morley responds:

As all editors know, it is from those pinched by the shoe that anguished outrage always emanates. I fear that Bill Gavin goes far, in quantity and quality, to justify my *obiter dicta* on the poor prospects of Conservatism as a political force in the United States. . . .

He is sorry for Mr. Nixon and so, within limits, am I. He thinks the President "has enough real troubles and real faults" without allegations that his tactics have at times resembled some used by the Nazis. But if CREEP wasn't trying, successfully, to secure a Ja vote of National Socialist proportions, then what in Heaven's name were all the dirty tricks attempting to achieve? It is a common indictment of "Liberals" that they find emotional excuses—of degrading environ-

ment, underprivilege, or whatnot—for red-handed criminals from our slums. Surely sentimentality is as misplaced when applied to that staunch Conservative Spiro T. Agnew, or others with a White House background.

Mr. Gavin asserts that "the word 'revolutionary' simply cannot be applied to any part of the Constitution of the United States." That does stagger me. If he will read the document he will find many provisions that were revolutionary, in the sense that they were nonexistent elsewhere at the time of their promulgation: "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives" . . . "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed" . . . "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States" . . . "The President, Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors" . . . "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury" . . . "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government" . . . "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."

These, of course, are all in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights immediately added many, even more revolutionary, provisions. It would seem obvious that a successful Conservative movement must be led by people with a fairly complete knowledge of their national history and institutions, thereby knowing what they are working to conserve. Mr. Gavin tends to confirm my point that this is not now the case.

He finds it difficult to grasp my meaning when I refer, obliquely, to the clause in the old Anglican prayer book which admonished parishioners "to be content" in the station to which God had called them. I thought that every well-informed Conservative would know about this, but probably should have spelled it out, as iconoclastic Charles Dickens did:

*Oh let us love our occupations,
Bless the Squire and his relations,
Live upon our daily rations
And always know our proper stations!*

It is precisely because most Americans refuse to know their "proper stations" that right-wing Conservatism, though irascible enough, is making such heavy headway in our troubled political waters.

Felix Morley
Gibson Island, Maryland

Current Wisdom

QUIDDITIES

A mortified Dr. Henry Steele Commager, formerly a famed tub thumper for gargantuan presidential power and forever a pedant, now tries the old fast shuffle to explain away one of his erstwhile enthusiasms.

All strong Presidents have aggrandized power just as all strong judges have "soaked up jurisdiction like a sponge." Are we witnessing now a shift from aggrandizement to usurpation? The distinction, not always clear, is that the former functions within the hospitable and accommodating framework of the Constitution, and the latter does not. Washington, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt were indubitably "stronger" Presidents than Mr. Nixon, but Nixon is the first who has openly declared that he will not observe the constitutional grant of war powers to the Congress and that he will not permit any interference with his own interpretation of "national security"; he is the first, too, to treat the guarantees of the Bill of Rights with open contempt.

—New York Review of Books

THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE REVISITED

If Webster had not been available we would not know that "billingsgate" refers to "foul and vulgar" talk . . . and we would not be able to point out the stunning illiteracy of the intellectualoids at Newsweek:

His Horatio Alger career had come to a police-blotter ending, but Spiro Agnew left one lasting monument on the national political scene: some of the most memorable billingsgate in modern oratory.

As the Administration's designated "cutting edge," he sallied forth to do battle with "troglodytic leftists," "radic-libs," "Spock-marked kids," and "self-appointed elitests."

—Newsweek

THE AMERICAN CASANOVA

An American coed speaks of an amatory ambush she endured while improving her mind at one of America's revolutionary institutions of higher learning:

One night after a mid-winter mixer she and her roommate agreed to let two Dartmouth freshmen sleep on their floor. "I went to the bathroom in the middle of the night," she recalled, "and when I returned, one of them had crawled into my bed. I told him to get out, and he said, 'But it's nice and warm in here.'" Sally got him out all right, but she was kept awake the rest of the night by his talking and turning in his sleep. "He was calling for his mommy," she said.

—Wall Street Journal

ARTS & MANNERS

An interesting exordium by Ms. Gore Vidal introducing his scholarly review of two volumes on the military academy:

On the table at which I write is a small silver mug with a square handle; it is inscribed to Eugene L. Vidal, Jr., October 3, 1925—a gift from the West Point football team to its mascot, which that year was not a mule but me. I drank milk from the cup for a good many years and from the look of the rim did a bit of teething on it, too. I have no early memory of West Point.

—New York Review of Books

LAND OF OPPORTUNITY

Clever rejoinder by Mrs. Joann Chapman, 37, the Michigan Consolidated Gas Company's first female jackhammer operator:

Sure I'm for women's liberation. I figure we need the money too.

—Associated Press

TV INTELLECTUALOIDS IN ACTION

Writing in the New York Times Book Review, Elizabeth Drew shows that TV commentators are not only profound political analysts, but real graceful writers to boot:

It is becoming fashionable to dismiss the McGovern candidacy as an aberration, with or without Watergate, to assert that the Democratic party has taken self-corrective measures, that the left does not have a candidate now, that never again will the issues be acid and abortion and quotas and gays. I think that is missing the point of 1972. McGovern's nomination was, as are most candidates', partially the product of other politicians' failures, and the ineffectiveness of his Presidential campaign to a great degree a product of his own. His nomination was nonetheless a remarkable precedent. His candidacy was also the vehicle of reforming forces in American politics that I believe Hart is correct in saying are not going to disappear. Nor are the questions of life styles and values. Nor are some of the more worrisome questions, dramatized in 1972, about how we pick our Presidents.

—New York Times Book Review

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

A thrilling tale of extraterrestrial lewdness:

Police at Winston-Salem, N.C., got a call from a woman who said she was passed in her front yard by a UFO that "had a very long blue tail, blew wind up her dress and made the trees in her yard sway."

—New York Post

THE GURU OF BLOOMINGTON

While discussing the life and times of Tom Charles Huston, Rolling Stone, the journal of rock, canonizes a new American folk hero—possibly the Abbie Hoffman of the seventies:

He made his final exit from Washington in a five-ton U-Haul truck loaded with books—most of them political biographies—and driven by a wild man, R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., a one-time folk singer and suspected Marxist who turned down a speechwriting job with Spiro Agnew last January to continue as editor-in-chief of *The Alternative* on a rented 40-acre farm four miles outside of Bloomington. . . .

But in 1971, coming home to Indiana, the crazy Tyrrell, who once shaved off his mustache because one side was red and the other brown, bitched that there wasn't any cold beer and embarrassed Huston by exuberantly pounding on the side of the truck to get the attention of pretty girls driving west. And Huston, swigging Coke and smoking his "rotten smelling" pipe, talked about Calhoun and Randolph as the truck moved toward Indiana.

—Rolling Stone

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE

High-grade fiction begins where low-grade political analysis abounds; read the Nation:

The development of the New Left gave to America what it had lacked since the end of World War II, a sense of optimism and dynamism. Problems were openly discussed, solutions debated, manifestoes issued.

—Nation

VOICES OF MODERATION

Just another objective news story from the Newsweek neurotics:

He stood with trembling hands in the half-light of a Federal courtroom in Baltimore last week, awash in the evidence against him and bargaining like any run-of-the-street felony suspect to stay out of prison. For five years, Spiro T. Agnew, 54, had been the pre-eminent public moralist of the Nixon Administration—the scourge of crime and license and permissiveness in American life. But now Agnew found himself accused of crimes of the most squalid sort—selling favors for payoffs as a county official, as a governor and even as Vice President—and the cost of his freedom was dear. He pleaded no contest to one count of tax evasion, suffered the whole tawdry story to be spread on the record and left Washington in disgrace—the second man ever to quit the Vice Presidency and the first to go out a convicted criminal.

—Newsweek

CONTINUING CRISIS
(continued from page 2)

forty-five year sentences of the Watergate gang, some of whom will be walking the streets in a matter of months. And hopes for the environment dimmed when Mr. Zbigniew Jaworowski found manifestations of pollution in the ice layers of the Himalayas. Law and Order infatuates have prevailed in Sri Lanka where food stealers will be flogged. And good news continues to bloom in the humanitarian paradise of Zaire where impolite tourists caught photographing pygmies will be shot on sight. Finally a flood of creativity has been released in Mbabane, Swaziland, where King Sobhuza II, the celebrated aesthete, has announced a contest to provide new music for the words of that great nation's national anthem. Rejecting the present melody as too complex to sing, the philosopher king is offering \$149 to the Swazilandic Beethoven who scrawls the right notes.

● Meanwhile back in the United States the President's fall offensive began, becoming increasingly so throughout the month. Speaking to businessmen, governors, congressmen, and senators, he insisted on his innocence. His most impressive performance came on November 17 when he held an hour-long, nationally-televised question and answer period with over four hundred newspapermen at Disney World, an unfortunate choice of location, but a choice that is still characteristic of much

White House behavior. But America was not the only country bathed in presidential oratory. In a stirring presidential address, dramatized by sobs and sniffles, President Kenneth Kaunda of democratic Zambia threatened resignation unless his people forswore their "excessive drinking habits."

● But there were signs of increased apathy in the United States. When Mr. John Harrington staggered into a Miami Beach saloon screaming for help after having been shot by a holdup man, he was ejected for being too noisy. With blood streaming from his chest he had to handle thirty cents and take a bus to Jackson Memorial Hospital where he was reported in critical condition. In Britain moral vigilance was aroused when the Unitarian Church of America attempted to ship in a film on sex education which Her Majesty's custom agents confiscated for its lewdness.

● And finally, this will be remembered as the month during which one of William F. Buckley, Jr.'s favorite bits of facitiae lost its humor. That drollery of his about the Washington bureaucrats "tippey toeing" into the nation's living rooms to adjust thermostats became stunningly unfunny the evening of November 7 when Mr. Nixon divulged his energy plan featuring fifty-mile-per-hour speed limits, sixty to sixty-eight degree living rooms, and several other policy curiosities, proving that, in the welfare state, yesterday's buffoonery is tomorrow's policy. □

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